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Abstract
Women in the military are more likely to be raped by other service
members than to be killed in combat. Female prisoners internalize rape by
corrections officers as an inherent part of their sentence. Immigrants held
in detention fearing deportation or other legal action endure rape to avoid
compromising their cases. This Article draws parallels among closed
institutional systems of prisons, immigration detention, and the military.
The closed nature of these systems creates an environment where sexual
victimization occurs in isolation, often without knowledge of or intervention
by those on the outside, and the internal processes for addressing this
victimization allow for sweeping discretion on the part of system actors.
This Article recommends a two-part strategy to better make victims whole
and effect systemic, legal, and cultural change: the use of civil lawsuits
generally, with a focus on the class action suit, supplemented by
administrative law to enforce federal rules on sexual violence in closed
systems. This Article strives to break down the walls that separate these
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different closed systems into silos, toward an end of shifting laws and policy
to better address the multi-faceted problem ofsexual victimization.
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INTRODUCTION
A Lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps, Ariana Klay, endured
sexual abuse so horrific that she requested to be deployed to Afghanistan to
escape the hostile environment.2 A female inmate in a low security program
in Michigan requested to be sent back to jail rather than face the officers that
abused her upon entrance to a lower security program.3 A detainee at an
immigration facility gave up an appeal of her deportation case, despite
having four children who were citizens of the United States, to avoid the
abuse she encountered.4  These real-life examples illustrate the drastic
lengths those who endure sexual violence5 will go through to escape further
victimization in the insular institutional settings of prison, immigration
detention centers, and the military.
Across the country, female prisoners are routinely relegated to solitary
confinement-a practice internationally condemned as a human rights
violation-to "protect" them from the sexual victimization they endure at
the hands of prison guards, staff, and other inmates.6 This practice is also
1. Klay was the named plaintiff in the class action lawsuit, Klay v. Panetta, 758 F.3d 369 (D.C.
Cir. 2014). See infra Section III.B.2 for further discussion.
2. While speaking on behalf of Senator Kirsten Gillibrand's Military Justice Improvement Act
on November 6, 2013, Klay said the following: "[t]o get out of this climate, after six months, I
sought and received a by-name request to deploy to Afghanistan. My command denied my requests,
four times, under the rationale that I was too critical to the command, only six months before I was
assaulted." Adam Mordecai, A Marine Was Assaulted. Her Commander Said She Deserved It for
Wearing Running Shorts, UPWORTHY (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.upworthy.com/a-marine-was-
assaulted-her-commander-said-she-deserved-it-for-wearing-running-shorts-really.
3. "I protected myself by removing myself and requested to be sent back to jail because Sgt. [B]
was still workin [sic] there as well as officer, Mr. [R]." Interview with Inmate #11, on file with
author. This article contains de-identified quotes extracted from files in the Neal case; however, due
to confidentiality constraints, editors were not permitted access to these original documents for
verification, and the authors assume responsibility for accuracy.
4. See Bessie Mufioz, Immigrants for Sale: Corporate America Puts a Price Tag on Sexual
Abuse, 17 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY'S L. REV. & Soc. JUST. 553, 574-75 (2015).
5. This Article uses the term "sexual violence" or "sexual victimization" as umbrella terms to
refer to a range of acts including rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment. The use of these terms
is consistent with language promulgated by the United Nations and the Council of Europe
Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence. See
EUROPEAN INST. FOR GENDER EQUAL., THE STUDY TO IDENTIFY AND MAP EXISTING DATA AND
RESOURCES ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE EU 7 (2012).
6. See generally Reassessing Solitary Confinement: The Human Rights, Fiscal and Safety
Consequences: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights,
and Human Rights, 112 Cong. 1 (June 19, 2012); ACLU, WORSE THAN SECOND-CLASS: SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES (2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/
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used in immigration detention facilities, where experts estimate that as many
as 300 individuals are placed in solitary confinement every day.7 Similarly,
military victims of sexual violence routinely leave service or are forced out
of their positions as a means of "protection." Despite these common
responses that address sexual violence either as an occupational hazard or a
condition of confinement, deployment to a war zone or detention in a small
windowless space twenty-four hours a day are not effective solutions or
appropriate remedies to address the rampant institutional problem of sexual
violence.10 The desperation inherent in these measures reflects the current
state of affairs as it relates to the problem of sexual violence in detention
facilities"-specifically prisons and immigration detention centers-and
across military branches in the United States.
The military and detention facilities1 2  reflect exceedingly high
occurrences of sexual violence. 13 Measuring these occurrences to provide
meaningful comparison is challenging because there are no universally
agreed-upon definitions of sexual violence or regular data collection efforts
across these systems. 1 4 The data that is available shows that in 2014, 6131
sexual assaults were reported in the military. 5 The U.S. Department of
files/assets/worsethansecond-class.pdf.
7. See Azadeh Shahshahani & Ayah Natasha El-Sergany, Challenging the Practice of Solitary
Confinement in Immigration Detention in Georgia and Beyond, 16 CUNY L. REV. 243, 245 (2013).
8. The authors use the terms victim and survivor interchangeably in this Article.
9. See THE INVISIBLE WAR (Chain Camera Pictures 2012).
10. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ALL Too FAMILIAR: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WOMEN IN U.S.
STATE PRISONS (1996) [hereinafter ALL TOO FAMILIAR]; see also infra Part III.
11. Here, this Article uses the term "detention facilities" to refer to institutional settings where
individuals are intentionally confined, specifically, prisons and immigration detention facilities. See
Shahshahani & El-Sergany, supra note 7, at 253.
12. This Article includes prisons and immigration detention facilities under the broad category of
"detention."
13. See ALL TOO FAMILIAR, supra note 13; Meghan Rhoad, Detained and at Risk: Sexual Abuse
and Harassment in United States Immigration Detention, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 25, 2010),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/08/2 5/detained-and-risk/sexual-abuse-and-harassment-united-state
s-immigration-detention [hereinafter Detained and at Risk]; Sara Darehshori & Meghan Rhoad,
Embattled: Retaliation Against Sexual Assault Survivors in the US Military, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(May 18, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/05/18/embattled/retaliation-against-sexual-assaul
t-survivors-us-military [hereinafter Embattled].
14. See infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
15. See DEP'T OF DEF., SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE, ANNUAL REPORT ON
SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY FISCAL YEAR 2014 (2015) [hereinafter DOD ANNUAL REPORT
FY14], http://sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/FY14_Annual/FY14_DoDSAPROAnnual Report on
SexualAssault.pdf.
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Justice estimates that between 149,200 and 209,400 inmates are victims of
sexual abuse each year.1 6 Female inmates are disproportionately victimized
by both staff and other inmates, and less than eight percent of those
victimized report it to authorities.1 7  Statistics on sexual violence are not
readily available for immigration detention facilities-a 2004 Human Rights
Watch Report reveals that as of its publication date, "[n]o systematic
research has ever been undertaken to examine sexual abuse in immigration
detention centers, and no statistics about its frequency have been
collected."" In 2011, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed
requests pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act to obtain statistics from
the United States Government; the resulting documentation reflected only
minimal reports of abuse, unlikely reflecting the true number of incidences.19
Despite their shared status as institutions in which sexual violence
occurs frequently, the military, detention facilities, and prisons may seem ill-
suited for comparison. The nation's service men and women are highly
revered, praised, and celebrated by society, while prisoners and immigration
detainees are disdained, discarded, and effectively removed from the
collective consciousness. 20  In reality, both kinds of institutions have a
commitment to safety at their core, although they address it from different
perspectives. The military is dedicated to enforcing the law and preserving
national security, while prison and immigration detention facilities are
committed to punishing or rehabilitating those who break the law and
16. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS AND JAILS REPORTED BY
INMATES 2011-12 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjrilll2.pdf.
17. See PAUL GUERINO & ALLEN BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION
REPORTED BY ADULT CORRECTIONAL AUTHORITIES, 2007-2008 8 (Jan. 2011), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/svraca0708.pdf [hereinafter BJS STATISTICS 2011].
18. ALEX COOLMAN ET AL., STOP PRISONER RAPE, NO REFUGE HERE: A FIRST LOOK AT SEXUAL
ABUSE IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION (2004), http://www.ncdsv.org/images/JD NoRefugeHere
2004.pdf [hereinafter STOP PRISONER RAPE].
19. American Civil Liberties Union, Sexual Abuse in Immigration Detention Facilities: Sexual
Abuse Complaints Since 2007 from ACLU Freedom of Information Act Documents, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/map/sexual-abuse-immigration-detention-facilities (last visited Apr. 20, 2017).
There were 200 allegations of abuse in the Freedom of Information Act files, but there is no doubt
the actual instances were much higher. Id. Although this number may not accurately reflect the
number of abuses, it still shows that sexual violence in detention is a widespread issue.
20. See Public Esteem for Military Still High, PEWRESEARCH CTR. (July 11, 2013), http://
www.pewforum.org/2013/07/11/public-esteem-for-military-still-high/; see also Francis T. Cullen et
al., Public Opinion About Punishment and Corrections, 27 CRIME & JUST. 1 (2000).
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threaten the security of local communities.21  Beyond their shared safety
goals, these systems have more in common than is immediately apparent.
Detention facilities and the military are both insular, "closed systems,"
meaning they are distinguishable from the general community.2 2 There are
nuances inherent in both environments that create a separate system within a
broader social system. The unique structure of a closed system means that it
is independent and has its own rules and policies-both formal and
informal-that allow it to address problems internally. 23 A closed-system
model implies that the system does not depend on the external environment
for solutions to managerial issues; instead, it is enclosed-sealed off from
the outside world.2 4  The military functions in this way because of "[t]he
unique authority and responsibilities of commanders, the need for effective
and efficient procedures in a wide range of places and circumstances,
including combat, and the critical importance of obedience of orders and
adherence to standards of conduct all distinguish military society from the
society at large."2 5
The closed nature of the military and detention facilities creates an
environment in which sexual victimization occurs in isolation, often without
knowledge of or intervention by those on the outside. 26  The internal
processes for addressing this victimization allow for sweeping discretion on
the part of system actors.2 7  Within both systems, accusations of sexual
violence are addressed by specialized, unique, and complex internal policies
and procedures distinct from those in the civilian community. 28 As part of
recent attention and scrutiny, major flaws have been observed in both
systems; some of the same issues identified in the prison system for
reporting sexual assault were identified in the military context, and vice
21. See About the Department of Defense (DoD), U.S. DEP'T DEF., https://www.defense.gov/
About-DoD (last updated Jan. 27, 2017).
22. See generally JEFF HEARN & WENDY PARKIN, GENDER, SEXUALITY AND VIOLENCE IN
ORGANIZATIONS: THE UNSPOKEN FORCES OF ORGANIZATION VIOLATIONS (2001).
23. See Daniel Katz & Robert L. Kahn, Organizations and the Systems Concept, in CLASSICS OF
ORGINAZATIONAL THEORY 347, 356 (8th ed. 2016).
24. See generally RICHARD L. DAFT, ORGANIZATION THEORY AND DESIGN (7th ed. 2001).
25. John S. Cooke, Introduction: Fiftieth Anniversary of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
Symposium Edition, 165 MIL. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (2000).
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Part II.
28. See infra Part II.
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versa. 29  Female victims convey doubts about the reporting processes,
express fear of retaliation, and have concerns that they ultimately will not
find justice.3 0 Additionally, the fact that there is only minimal external
oversight on the internal reporting systems may explain why addressing
sexual assault is so difficult.
In comparing these two kinds of closed systems, this Article makes
connections using the narratives of individuals by relying on their
experiences of victimization, instances of reporting, and attempts to seek
justice.3 1 This Article stems from a National Science Foundation-funded
interdisciplinary research project3 2  that addresses a major gap in
understanding the reporting of sexual victimization in prison and the
confluence of factors that contribute to the ineffectiveness of prison-based
laws and policies.3 3 It is the hope that by using expertise gained in the
prison context and drawing connections to the military and immigration
detention centers, this Article will ultimately reveal that while the systems
are characterized by a culture of sexual violence that makes efforts to
address and eradicate such violence difficult, there is great potential in
utilizing specific legal tools to effect institutional change.3 4
Recommendations for legal solutions stem from the successes and
failures observed in this prison-based research. Ultimately, this Article
argues that a two-fold remedy, part administrative and part civil, is the best
29. See infra Part II.
30. See infra Part II.
3 1. See infra Part II.
32. See Sheryl P. Kubiak, Hannah Brenner, Deborah Bybee, & Rebecca Campbell, Award
Abstract # 1429948: Using an Ecological Framework to Examine Reporting of Abuse During
Incarceration, NAT'L SCI. FOUND. (July 10, 2015), http://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?
AWDID=1429948.
33. See id. To this end, this cohort of experts in law, social work, and psychology are utilizing
data, including personal narratives of inmate victims, from cases that formed the basis of the
groundbreaking class action lawsuit, Neal v. Department of Corrections, brought on behalf of over
800 women sexually victimized during incarceration. 824 N.W.2d 285 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012). This
Article argues that this lawsuit, its lessons learned, and the resulting remedies for Michigan class
members, both on an individual and prison-wide level, provide a useful template that can be
extrapolated to address similar issues nationwide. See infra Part III. This specific setting was
chosen for this article for multiple reasons, including that Michigan is home to some of the worst
prisons for sexual assault and is currently taking steps to comply with standards set by the Prison
Rape Elimination Act. See infra Part III.
34. See infra Parts I-II.
887
[Vol. 44: 881, 2017] Sexual Violence in Closed Institutional Systems
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
existing avenue for compensating victims and creating change.3 5 To
illustrate the relative effectiveness of the class action, this Article relies, as a
starting point, on the successes of Neal v. Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC)-class action litigation on behalf of over 800 inmates
in Michigan who were sexually victimized during incarceration.3 6 Although
the case does not craft a perfect remedy, the Neal court's settlement
nonetheless accomplished a number of significant ends: it provided
compensation for victims, resulted in changes to prison policies, acted as a
deterrent for future violence, placed other states on notice that sexual
victimization perpetrated by staff against inmates will not be tolerated, and
generated substantial public awareness through media coverage of sexual
victimization in prisons.3 7 There have not been any landmark civil cases on
sexual violence in the context of the military, but this is not for lack of
trying. A suit similar to Neal, Klay v. Panetta, was brought on behalf of
military members who were sexually victimized, but it had a different
outcome; its failure did not rest on the merits of the case, but rather hinged
on current Supreme Court jurisprudence surrounding limitations on military
liability.3 8 Litigation on behalf of victims of sexual violence in immigration
detention facilities has involved the administrative remedy of suing to
enforce the rules and guidelines set by the Prison Rape Elimination Act
(PREA) 3 9-a solution that is just beginning to be considered in the prison
context. This Article argues that this administrative remedy should be
utilized more readily and could effectively complement civil lawsuits like
35. See infra Part III.
36. See Neal v. Dep't of Corr. (Neal l), 583 N.W.2d 249 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
In 1996, Tracey Neal, and five other female prisoners filed a complaint on behalf of
themselves and all similarly situated female prisoners against the Michigan Department
of Corrections (MDOC), its directors, and various wardens and deputies in the prison
system. Plaintiffs filed suit in the circuit court specifically alleging eight causes of action
based on the treatment of women prisoners in the prison system.
Neal v. Dep't of Corr. (Neal II), No. 253543, 2005 WL 326883, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 10,
2005). See also Rachel Culley, "The Judge Didn't Sentence Me to Be Raped": Tracy Neal v.
Michigan Department of Corrections: A 15-Year Battle Against the Sexual Abuse of Women Inmates
in Michigan, 22 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 206 (2012).
37. Class Settlement Agreement, Neal l, 583 N.W.2d 249 (No. 96-6986-CZ). Although the case
settled before trial, it still yielded substantial financial compensation for victims and resulted in
important policy changes inside prison. Id. The survey data of the claimants reveals varying levels
of satisfaction with the outcome of the case, illustrating the limitations.
38. Klay v. Panetta, 758 F.3d 369 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 15607 (2016).
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Neal.4 0
Part I of this Article considers the defining characteristics of closed
institutional systems generally. Part II explores the prevalence and
incidence of sexual victimization in detention facilities and the military, as
well as corresponding policies and preventative strategies, identifying
parallels and drawing distinctions between these settings and the broader
community.4 2 Part II also exposes the extremely limited internal remedies
available to individuals who experience sexual victimization in these closed
systems. 43  Part III of the article transcends the discussion surrounding
limitations within these systems to consider the necessity of external
solutions, and specifically explores two avenues of relief to make victims
whole and effect systemic, legal, and cultural changes: (1) the use of civil
lawsuits generally, with a focus on the class action, supplemented by (2) the
use of administrative law to enforce federal rules on sexual violence in
closed systems.4 ' This Article strives to break down the walls that separate
these different closed systems into silos, toward an end of shifting laws and
policy to better address the multifaceted problem of sexual victimization.
I. CLOSED INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS
Scholars describe a "closed system" as one that is "sufficiently
independent to allow most of its problems to be analyzed with reference to
its internal structure and without reference to its external environment." 46
Social scientist Erving Goffman created the term "total institution" to refer
to a place where people both live and work and are, at the same time,
isolated from the larger community for a significant length of time.4 7
Examples of the "total institution" include mental hospitals and institutions,41
military settings, and incarceration sites such as jails and prisons.
40. See Neal l, 583 N.W.2d 249.
41. See infra Part I.
42. See infra Part II.
43. See infra Part II.
44. See infra Part III.
45. See infra Part III.
46. Katz & Kahn, supra note 23, at 356.
47. Erving Goffman, The Characteristics of Total Institutions, in ORGANIZATION AND SOCIETY
312, 314 (1961).
48. Id. at 313.
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The unique structure of a closed system means that it lacks the influence
and oversight of external actors.49 It exists much like a silo, isolated from
the outside world and other closed systems.0 This isolation frequently leads
to problems within that are compounded by biases or assumptions that shape
the system's internal structures and processes." Further, its internal
processes and procedures are separate, nontransparent, and hidden from
those on the outside.5 2  The public often has no idea about the inner
workings of such a system. 5 3
"Closed organizations, such as residential care facilities, children's
homes and prisons, are relatively isolated from the outside world, and as
such, violations and violence are often contained and intensified."
Unfortunately, without the societal and legal checks and balances that exist
in the community, the closed system is a setting ripe for sexual violence to
occur unchecked, without recourse for its victims. 5 5 Both the military and
detention facilities are quintessential examples of closed systems because
they are governed by their own set of rules, laws, and policies; further,
external oversight is extremely limited.5 6  Perhaps unsurprisingly, both
systems have historically experienced disproportionately high incidences of
sexual assault, and victims in each have faced insurmountable barriers to
finding justice.5 7 Certain elements of the closed system, including reporting,
investigations, and retaliation, all contribute to an atmosphere where sexual
49. See Sheryl Pimlott Kubiak et al., "I Came to Prison to Do My Time-Not to Get Raped":
Coping Within the Institutional Setting, 8 STRESS, TRAUMA, & CRISIS: AN INT'L J. 157, 160 (2005)
[hereinafter I Came to Prison to Do My Time] (explaining the environment and structure of closed
organizations and how such an environment is prime for misconduct).
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 159-60.
56. See id. at 160; see also Lisa M. Schenck, Informing the Debate About Sexual Assault in the
Military Services: Is the Department of Defense Its Own Worst Enemy?, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
579, 582 (2014) (highlighting the differences in military society to that of civilian life); see also
MIKHAIL LYUBANSKY ET AL., CONFLICTING VIEWS ON CLOSED-SYSTEM CONFLICT: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE ROLE OF FIVE DANGEROUS BELIEF DOMAINS IN A PRISON SETTING, http://intemal.
psychology.illinois.edu/~lyubansk/prison.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2017) (explaining how prison is
an inherently closed system).
57. See infra Part II (highlighting the prevalence of sexual assault in detention centers and the
military and the obstacles that victims face).
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violence thrives and is difficult to curtail.
Sexual violence is prevalent in closed systems in part due to the lack of
external oversight, as well as the power imbalance inherent in the hierarchy
of these systems, and the existence of a tightly knit protective culture.5 9 The
system will assume a "state-like" role in members' lives where the internal
structures and processes are the primary and initial governing body,
supplanting civilian law and policy.6 0 These systems are self-governing,
with a complex and often self-created set of policies and procedures, as well
as a detailed and highly constraining set of informal norms that govern
appropriate behavior.6 1 The informal norms may supersede official policy
and procedure; therefore, the system is disincentivized from investigating
and punishing perpetrators of sexual violence because doing so would admit
its existence within the system.6 2
Prisons, immigration facilities, and the military are all structured slightly
differently but share core tenets of a closed system that obstruct victims
from being able to successfully report and receive justice for sexual violence
perpetrated against them.6 3
A. Military
In part because entrance is voluntary, there are certain constraints that
may inhibit individuals from reporting sexual violence in the military.
Survivors may remain silent because they have a desire to protect the
institution or fear betraying the system. 6 4 If they do report, they may feel
"doubly victimized," first by their attackers and second, by the process that
penalizes those who speak up about abuse.6 5 Further, the military is
characterized as a hyper-masculine culture and has been flagged as
potentially encouraging male aggression; hyper-masculine settings are more
58. See I Came to Prison to Do My Time, supra note 49.
59. See id.
60. See generally Francine Banner, Institutional Sexual Assault and the Rights/Trust Dilemma,
13 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 97 (2014).
61. See Goffman, supra note 59 (explaining the lifestyle of those in closed systems).
62. Id.
63. See Banner, supra note 60, at 134.
64. See id. at 137.
65. Id. at 166.
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prone to sexual violence.6 6
In many ways the military is indeed a quintessential example of a closed
institutional system. 6 7  The military exists as a separate entity within the
United States justice system, and in recognizing it as such, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that "the military is, by necessity, a specialized society
separate from civilian society . . . [and] that the military has, . . . by
necessity, developed laws and traditions of its own during its long history."6 8
The military is governed by its own policies, protocols, and procedures
separate from the civilian system of justice.6 9 It is an insular structure that
creates a unique cultural context in addition to its legal context.70  It elicits a
strong loyalty from its members and remains closed off-literally and
conceptually-from those on the outside.
The basis of the military justice system is the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), passed by Congress in 1950.72 Despite the extensive
codification of military law in existence today, the framework of the
military's closed system was not always governed by this code and
originally lacked much definition other than deference and service to one's
commander.7 3 It also bore little resemblance to the outside civilian system
66. See Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Breaking the Chain of Command Culture: A Call for an
Independent and Impartial Investigative Body to Curb Sexual Assaults in the Military, 29 WIS. J. L.
GENDER & SoC'Y 341, 347-52 (2015).
67. See OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC'Y OF DEF., POPULATION REPRESENTATION IN THE MILITARY
SERVICES: FISCAL YEAR 2000 (Feb. 2002), https://www.cna.org/pop-rep/2000/assets/pdf/chapters
2000.pdf. The military demonstrates the fact that it is a closed system by comparing its internal
statistics to those of its "civilian counterparts." Id.; see also infra notes 68-79 and accompanying
text.
68. Schenck, supra note 56 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1973)).
69. See generally Uniform Code of Military Justice of 1950, Pub. L. No 81-506, 64 Stat. 107
(2013).
70. See Andrew Ferris, Military Justice: Removing the Probability of Fairness, 63 U. CIN. L.
REV. 439, 452-54 (1994).
71. See id. Scholars take note of the difference in critiquing American law schools charged with
educating future lawyers; most schools do not offer even basic courses on military justice. See
Eugene R. Fidell, Military Justice Instruction in Civilian Law Schools, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 472, 474
(2011) ("The number seems to have risen in the last several years but plainly the vast majority of
schools still do not offer courses in military law.").
72 See Uniform Code of Military Justice of 1950, Pub. L. No 81-506, 64 Stat. 107 (2013). The
UCMJ underwent major subsequent revisions in 1968, 1983, and 2013. See National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, tit. XVII, §§ 1701-1753, 127 Stat. 672,
950-85 (2014).
73. See Cooke, supra note 25, at 3.
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of justice.7 4 In the creation of the UCMJ in the early 1950's, "[t]he aim was
to codify and explain existing practice, rather than to create new
procedures."7 5 The system was slow to change over time, but nonetheless
eventually evolved from its earliest incarnation.7 6 Today, for example, the
system allows an accused to have counsel present and allows the counsel to
speak during the proceedings-provisions previously not permitted.
Most significant was its acceptance of the idea that discipline
cannot be maintained without justice, and that justice requires, in
large measure, the adoption of civilian procedures. The new Code
was an effort to combine elements of two competing models: the
old command-dominated military justice system and the civilian
71
criminal justice system with its heavy emphasis on due process.
The multiple and sometimes competing functions of the military justice
system are revealed best perhaps in the Manual for Courts-Martial preamble:
"The purpose of military law is to promote justice, to assist in maintaining
good order and discipline in the armed forces, to promote efficiency and
effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the
national security of the United States."7 9  These goals characterize the
military's uniqueness as a closed institutional setting. 0
74. See id. at 3.
75. See id. at 5.
76. See id. at 10-17.
77. See id. at 5.
78. See id. at 8. The civilian criminal law system includes fundamental objectives like
discovering the truth, acquitting the innocent without unnecessary delay or expense, punishing the
guilty proportionately with their crimes, and preventing and deterring further crime, thereby
providing for the public order. See R. CHUCK MASON, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R41739, MILITARY
JUSTICE: COURTS-MARTIAL, AN OVERVIEW, summary (Aug. 12, 2013). Military justice shares these
objectives in part, but also serves to enhance discipline throughout the Armed Forces, serving the
overall goal of providing an effective national defense. Id.
79. JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED
STATES, I-1 (2012), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/MCM-2012.pdf.
80. See id. at 5. The military justice system has its own structure, rules of evidence, judges, and
punishment procedure. Id. at 1-1-2.
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B. Prisons and Immigration Detention Centers
This Article refers broadly to institutions of detention to describe
settings where individuals are intentionally confined, specifically prisons
and immigration detention centers. Drawing a connection between these
two seemingly disparate systems is not without precedent: "[c]ivil detention
centers in theory provide for the temporary holding of immigrants.
Therefore, their practices must be distinguishable from prisons and jails.
Yet in reality, there are few practical differences between correctional
facilities and the facilities used to detain immigrants." Importantly, they
are both closed systems whose occupants are governed by internal policies
and procedures, often have limited constitutional rights and access to the
legal system, and are at the lower end of a power hierarchy.8 2 Further, they
are both similarly situated because they are governed by PREA rules.8 3
"Today, [in the United States,] prisons are the primary means of
dispensing punishment for serious crimes, and their use is accelerating. 84
As of the end of 2014, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that
6,851,000 people were under correctional supervision in the United States, 5
and of these, 2,224,400 offenders in 2014 were in state or federal prisons, or
local jails.8 6  Women are a growing percentage of the population. 7  The
number of women in prison increased by more than 700% between 1980 and
2014, rising from 26,378 female prisoners to 215,332.
Prisons are governed by their own set of rules and norms-formal and
informal-and their actors operate almost entirely internally.8 9 The mission
of United States Correctional facilities is to "provide constitutional, ethical,
humane, safe, and cost-effective prisons, jails, and community corrections
81. Shahshahani & El-Sergany, supra note 7, at 253.
82. See Hearn, supra note 22.
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 15607(c) (2016).
84. Alexander Volokh, Developments in the Law: The Law ofPrisons, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1838,
1841 (2002).
85. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
(2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpusl4.pdf.
86. See id. at 2.
87. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT SHEET: INCARCERATED WOMEN AND GIRLS (2015), http://
www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/ccIncarceratedWomenFactsheetSep24sp.pdf.
88. Id.
89. See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
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programs and facilities." 9 0 Prisons are given much leeway to create policies
to accomplish these goals.9 1 "Prison life is precisely regimented, and
conditions are similar across many variables, including general quality of
life variables, population composition, and authority structure between
inmates and corrections officers."9 2 When problems arise in a prison, they
are dealt with using a "closed system approach," which relies on internal
organizational processes and dynamics to account for organizational, group,
and individual behaviors.9 3 Thus, in addressing issues like the perpetration
of sexual assault against inmates, closed system officials look for
explanations within the prison itself and then attempt to adopt appropriate
internal correctional measures.9 4 When looking for explanations, the prison
might examine its policies, interview its prison warden and correctional
officers, analyze prison culture, explore officer-inmate interaction and
inmate-inmate interaction, and evaluate other organizational components of
the prison.9
Immigration detention centers are unique facilities that house
immigrants, typically those who are defending their immigration status in
the United States.9 6 Individuals in these facilities are detained for alleged
civil violations of U.S. Immigration law and include "asylum seekers,
undocumented immigrants, legal permanent residents convicted of certain
crimes, refugees who the US had accepted for resettlement but who did not
apply for permanent residency in time, and even US citizens whose
citizenship the government disputes."9 7  Further, "[a]pproximately one [in
90. Mission and Goals, NAT'L INST. CORRECTIONS, https://nicic.gov/mission (last visited Apr.
17, 2017).
91. See Lyubansky et al., supra note 68.
92. Id.
93. JENNIFER M. ALLEN & RAJEEV SAWHNEY, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A SERVICE QUALITY APPROACH 28 (2d ed. 2015).
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See Molly Hennessy-Fiske & Cindy Carcamo, Overcrowded, Unsanitary Conditions Seen at
Immigrant Detention Centers, L.A. TIMES (June 18, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/
nationnow/la-na-nn-texas-immigrant-children-2014061 8-story.html#page= 1.
97. Detained and at Risk, supra note 13. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) prescribes
mandatory and discretionary immigration detention, five categories of noncitizens who must be
detained, and discretion on detention for citizens awaiting removal proceedings. See Immigration &
Nationality Act § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). "The Secretary of Homeland Security and the AG
must detain five categories of noncitizens: (1) certain arriving noncitizens, (2) noncitizens subject to
'expedited removal,' (3) noncitizens who have certain criminal convictions, (4) suspected terrorists,
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ten] immigration detainees is seeking asylum [or] petitioning for safe haven
in the United States . . . after fleeing . . . violence in his or her home
country.9 8 The refugees fleeing violence may be victims of trafficking,
survivors of sexual assault or domestic violence, pregnant women, or
nursing mothers.9 9 Detention functions as a constitutionally permissible
mechanism to facilitate removal from the United States and is allegedly used
to "prevent individuals from fleeing or endangering public safety." 0 0
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) governs the detention and
removal of noncitizens.1 0 1 Because these facilities are responsible for civil
punishment and not criminal, if conditions of confinement become unduly
punitive, they may be deemed unconstitutional. 102
Detention centers exist in multiple states,1 03 and the number of people
detained increases each year. 10 4  In 2012, the government detained
approximately 400,000 people in immigration custody in roughly 250
facilities-9% of whom are women. 10 5 The length of stay for a pre-removal-
and (5) noncitizens who have final orders of removal." Faiza W. Sayed, Challenging Detention:
Why Immigrant Detainees Receive Less Process than "Enemy Combatants" and Why They Deserve
More, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1838-39 (2011). Section 236(a) of the INA allows for the arrest
and detention of a noncitizen "pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from
the United States." Immigration & Nationality Act § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
98. NAT'L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., NATIONAL PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION
COMMISSION REPORT 1, 177-78 (June 2009), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/226680.pdf
[hereinafter PREA COMMISSION REPORT 2009].
99. See Alison Parker & Meghan Rhoad, US: Victims of Trafficking Held in ICE Detention:
Letter to the US Department of State on 2010 Trafficking in Persons Report, HUM. RTS. WATCH,
(Apr. 19, 2010, 11:56 A.M.), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/04/19/us-victims-trafficking-held-
ice-detention.
100. Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 44
(2010).
101. See Sayed, supra note 97, at 1843.
102. See Kalhan, supra note 100, at 44 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987);
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16
(1979) ("Due process requires that a pretrial [criminal] detainee not be punished.")).
103. See Sexual Abuse in Immigration Detention Facilities-Methodology, ACLU, https://
www.aclu.org/sexual-abuse-immigration-detention-facilitites-methodology (last visited Apr. 17,
2017).
104. See Kalhan, supra note 100, at 44-45. "In 1994, officials held approximately 6,000
noncitizens in detention on any given day. That daily average had surpassed 20,000 individuals by
2001 and 33,000 by 2008. . . . This growth has been fueled by enforcement policies that subject
ever-larger categories of individuals to removal charges and custody . . . ." Id.
105. See Detained and at Risk, supra note 13; see also The Issues, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK,
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/resources (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).
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order detainee in this type of facility is estimated to be eighty-one days on
average, but some experience stays of longer than a year.1 0 6 Recently issued
Executive Orders suggest that the number of detainees as well as the amount
of time they spend in facilities will continue to increase. 10 7 The conditions
of confinement in immigration detention facilities across the United States
are sometimes characterized as inadequate to serve their intended purpose,"o
and worse, are argued to present human rights issues and violations of
international law.1 0 9 Scholars identify issues such as inadequate medical
care, 110 the improper use of solitary confinement,1  concerns of coercion and
due process, 112 inadequate access to counsel,1 1 3 and prolonged and indefinite
detention.1 14  Notwithstanding the fact that those individuals housed in the
106. See Kalhan, supra note 100, at 49; see generally Donald Kerwin & Serena Yi-Ying Lin,
Immigrant Detention: Can ICE Meet Its Legal Imperatives and Case Management Responsibilities?,
MIGRATION POL'Y INST. 16 (Sept. 2009), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigrant-
detention-can-ice-meet-its-legal-imperatives-and-case-management-responsibilities. Of the 10,771
immigrants who received final orders of removal, 8513 were detained for less than ninety days
(79%), 1266 were detained for between ninety days and six months (12%), 676 were detained for
between six months and one year (6%), and 316 were detained for one year or more (11%). Id. at
17.
107. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 3 C.F.R. § 6 (2017).
108. See Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the
Porous Border ofthe Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087, 1111-27 (1995).
109. See id.
International law prohibits arbitrary detention. The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, art. 9, requires that anyone who is deprived of liberty by arrest or
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that court may
decide without delay on the lawfulness of the detention and order release if the detention
is not lawful.
Arzoo Rajani, Remedies for Detainees: The Impact of the Ninth Circuit's Decision on Medical
Negligence Cases, 5 U. MASS. ROUNDTABLE SYIP. L.J. 210, 243 n.42 (2010).
110. See Stacey A. Tovino, The Grapes of Wrath: On the Health of Immigration Detainees, 57
B.C. L. REV. 167, 177 (2016).
111. See Sarah Davila-Ruhaak, ICE's New Policy on Segregation and the Continuing Use of
Solitary Confinement Within the Context of International Human Rights, 47 MARSHALL L. REV.
1433, 1435 (2014).
112. See Sayed, supra note 97, at 1847. Enemy combatants, such as those at Guantanamo bay, are
in fact "afforded more procedural protections than are immigrant detainees subject to mandatory
detention." Sayed, supra note 97, at 1834; see generally Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp.
1488 (C.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990).
113. See Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representation for Detained Aliens: Litigation and
Administrative Reform, 29 CONN. L. REv. 1647, 1667 (1997).
114. See Kimere J. Kimball, A Right to Be Heard: Non-Citizens'Due Process Rights to in-Person
Hearings to Justify Their Detentions Pursuant to Removal, 5 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 159, 162 (2009).
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detention facilities are detained for civil-not criminal-violations of U.S.
immigration law, some experts have gone so far as to make the overt
comparison to conditions of incarceration or imprisonment."'
II. SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN DETENTION AND THE MILITARY
A. The Prevalence and Incidence ofSexual Violence in Detention
In 2009, in an effort to address the widespread problem of sexual
violence in prisons, Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination Act,
which "provides for the analysis of the incidence and effects of prison rape
in Federal, State, and local institutions and to provide information,
resources, recommendations, and funding to protect individuals from prison
rape." 11 6  While the PREA does not create a private right of action,1 17 it
implemented guidelines to facilitate reporting and create zero-tolerance
policies. 1 States' failure to comply with the guidelines results in the loss of
federal funding.1 1 9 Although not readily apparent from its title, the PREA
also applies to immigration detention centers. 120  Due in large part to the
insular nature of these institutions, sexual victimization in prison and
immigration detention facilities is significantly under-reported despite
115. See Kalhan, supra note 100, at 43. "Some commentators even resist the very term
'detention' as misplaced, masking circumstances approximating criminal 'incarceration' or
'imprisonment."' Kalhan, supra note 100, at 43; see also Shahshahani & El-Sergany, supra note 7,
at 253.
116. Prison Rape Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 147 (2003).
117. For a full discussion of courts' dismissal of PREA claims brought by prisoners for lack of a
private claim, see Gabriel Arkles, Prison Rape Elimination Act Litigation and the Perpetuation of
Sexual Harm, 17 LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 801 (2014).
118. Id.
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 15607(e)(2) (2003). Adoption of national standards:
For each fiscal year, any amount that a State would otherwise receive for prison purposes
for that fiscal year under a grant program covered by this subsection shall be reduced by
[five] percent, unless the chief executive of the State submits to the Attorney General-
(i) a certification that the State has adopted, and is in full compliance with, the national
standards described in subsection (a); or (ii) an assurance that the State intends to adopt
and achieve full compliance with those national standards so as to ensure that a
certification under clause (i) may be submitted in future years, which includes-(I) a
commitment that not less than [five] percent of such amount shall be used for this
purpose.
Id.
120. See 42 U.S.C. § 15607(c) (2016). See also Munoz, supra note 4, at 574.
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widespread understanding and acceptance of its prevalence. 121  The closed
nature of these systems makes it difficult to report sexual violence,
complicates an already challenging investigation process, and reinforces
fears related to retaliation. 122
1. Prisons
Recently, there has been significant attention directed at problems
within the United States prison system. 123  The specific issue of sexual
violence in prisons is the focus of news articles, 12 4 Congressional hearings, 125
and even a recurring theme on television, such as the highly popular
memoir-tumed-Netflix-series: Orange Is the New Black.126 Recent litigation
filed on behalf of six female prisoners in New York State highlights the
pervasive and ongoing victimization of inmates. 127 This victimization is not
easily addressed due to complexities involving reporting and investigation of
claims. 128
In correctional settings, abuse is perpetrated both by other inmates and
correctional staff. 129 Understanding the dynamics of sexual violence in
121. See Anthony C. Thompson, What Happens Behind Locked Doors: The Difficulty of
Addressing and Eliminating Rape in Prison, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 119,
164 (2009).
122. See id.
123. See The Editorial Board, Mr. Obama Takes on the Prison Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/opinion/president-obama-takes-on-the-prison-crisis.html?_
r-0.
124. Id.
125. See generally National Prison Rape Elimination Commission Report and Standards: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009).
126. See generally PIPER KERMAN, ORANGE IS THE NEW BLACK: MY LIFE IN A WOMEN'S PRISON
(2011); Orange Is the New Black (Netflix 2013).
127. See Benjamin Weiser, Suit Alleges Persistent Sexual Abuse ofFemale Inmates in New York
State Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/nyregion/6-
inmates-file-suit-alleging-persistent-sexual-abuse-of-women-in-new-york-state-prisons.html?smprod
-nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share&_r-0; see also Class Action Complaint at 1, Jones v.
Dep't of Corrections, No. 1:2016cv01473 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.legal-aid.org/
media/201965/02.26.16_complaint.pdf.
128. See Thompson, supra note 121.
129. See BARBARA OWEN ET AL., GENDERED VIOLENCE AND SAFETY: A CONTEXTUAL
APPROACH TO IMPROVING SECURITY IN WOMEN'S FACILITIES PART I OF III (Dec. 2008),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/225338.pdf; see also M. Dyan McGuire, The Empirical
and Legal Realities Surrounding Staff Perpetrated Sexual Abuse of Inmates, 46 No. 3 CRIM. L.
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prison requires an understanding of prison culture as a whole.13 0 Sexual
victimization that occurs in prison differs from the outside society due in
large part to the power imbalance between staff and inmates and the general
prohibition on sexual relations between inmates or between inmates and
staff-expressed statutorily by making it impossible for an inmate to legally
give consent to staff.131 It is also complicated by the fact that upon entrance
to prison, as part of the punishment, an inmate gives up certain rights,
liberty, goods and services, autonomy, security, and privacy. 13 2
The Bureau of Justice Statistics defines staff sexual misconduct
generally as "any behavior or act of a sexual nature, either consensual or
nonconsensual, directed toward an inmate by an employee, volunteer,
official visitor, or agency representative." 133 Specific acts that are prohibited
include inappropriate "[i]ntentional touching of the genitalia, anus, groin,
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks with the intent to abuse, arouse, or gratify
sexual desire; [as well as c]ompleted, attempted, threatened, or requested
sexual acts." 134 An additional category disallows "[o]ccurrences of indecent
exposure, invasion of privacy, or staff voyeurism for sexual gratification." 135
Stringent correctional policies bar any sort of sexual relationship, consensual
or otherwise, and restrict "overfamiliar" relationships between inmates and
staff during incarceration. 136  Further, laws across almost all states prohibit
BULL. 1, 2 (2010).
130. See MARK S. FLEISHER & JESSIE L. KRIENERT, THE CULTURE OF PRISON SEXUAL VIOLENCE
(Nov. 2006), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/216515.pdf.
131. See Hannah Brenner et al., Bars to Justice: The Impact on Rape Myths on Women in Prison,
17 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 521, 538 (2016).
132. See id. at 549. Therefore, some privacy violations that would be deemed abuse in the
community are in fact mandated by prison policy. Id. Michigan's policy directive on Staff-Prisoner
Sexual Misconduct clearly separates abusive acts from proper duties, clarifying that "[t]his does not
include acts related to official duties (e.g., strip searches, pat down searches, chest compressions
during CPR)." MICH. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, POLICY DIRECTIVE: PROHIBITED SEXUAL CONDUCT
INVOLVING PRISONERS 2 (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/
03_03_140_481633_7.pdf. See Flyn L. Flesher, Cross-Gender Supervision in Prisons and the
Constitutional Right ofPrisoners to Remain Free from Rape, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 841,
865 (2007).
133. McGuire, supra note 129, at 2.
134. Id.; see also Owen, supra note 129, at 16.
135. McGuire, supra note 129, at 2.
136. See MICH. DEP'T OF CORR., POLICY DIRECTIVE: PROHIBITED SEXUAL CONDUCT INVOLVING
PRISONERS, supra note 132, at 1. "E. Staff Overfamiliarity-Conduct between an employee and a
prisoner which has resulted in or is likely to result in intimacy, including but not limited to a kiss or
a hug, or a close personal or non-work related association." Id.
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any sort of sexual relationship between inmates and correctional staff,
statutorily criminalizing even "consensual" sexual acts. 13 7 The rationale for
these laws and policies is informed by the inherent power imbalance
between inmate and staff and the vulnerability of inmates to abuse.13 8
The extent to which sexual violence occurs in women's prisons was
largely unknown until Human Rights Watch (HRW) uncovered details about
abuses in prisons across the United States in the mid-1990s with its report:
All Too Familiar: Sexual Abuse of Women in U.S. State Prisons.1 3 9 In this
report, HRW exposed the rampant nature of abuse, identified the flawed
reporting processes, and revealed that internal investigations rarely yielded
justice for victims. 140  Legal advocates who interacted with the prison
population filed lawsuits on behalf of these incarcerated victims, including
the landmark class action, Neal v. MDOC, the lawsuit that forms the basis
for this ongoing NSF-funded research study.1 4 1  In response, the federal
government created the PREA Commission to brainstorm laws and policies
to effectively reduce and address sexual abuse in prison. 142
Despite state correctional facilities' attempts to comply with the
implemented zero-tolerance policies demanded by PREA, the number of
inmates who still face sexual abuse during incarceration annually is
significant. 143 Both male and female inmates report being abused by inmates
and staff of the same or opposite sex. 1 44 In 2013, 2.4% (34,100) of inmates
surveyed "reported an incident involving facility staff, and 0.4% (5,500)
reported both an incident by another inmate and staff." 1 4 5  While both
inmates and correctional staff-male and female-are perpetrators of abuse,
137. See NIC/WCL PROJECT ON ADDRESSING PRISON RAPE, FIFTY-STATE SURVEY OF CRIMINAL
LAWS PROHIBITING SEXUAL ABUSE OF INDIVIDUALS IN CUSTODY (Aug. 2009), http://www.
prearesourcecenter.org/sites/default/files/library/50statesurveyofssmlawsfinal2009update.pdf.
138. See Aubrey J. Bromse, Prison Abuse: Prison-Staff Relations, 57 GUILD PRAC. 216, 222
(2000); see, e.g., Brenda V. Smith, Analyzing Prison Sex: Reconciling Self-Expression with Safety,
13 No. 3 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 17, 18 (2006).
139. See generally ALL TOO FAMILIAR, supra note 13.
140. Id.
141. Class Settlement Agreement at 1, Neal v. Mich. Dep't of Corr. (Neal 1), 583 N.W.2d 249
(Mich. Ct. App. 1998), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-MI-0021-0003.pdf. See
also Culley, supra note 36.
142. See National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, 42 U.S.C. § 15606 (2003).
143. ALLEN J. BECK ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS AND JAILS
REPORTED BY INMATES, 2011-12 (May 2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjriI1l2.pdf.
144. See id. at 17.
145. See id. at 6.
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the specific subsets of female inmates who are victimized by male
correctional staff are staggering. 146 Unfortunately, researchers estimate that
the number of sexual assaults is much higher than the numbers suggest
because inmates may not report, even to researchers, for myriad reasons.1 4 7
Because prison is a closed system, a victim is largely limited to
reporting sexual abuse internally and thus must adhere to the internal
policies and procedures regarding reporting. 14  Pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), to preserve the right to sue civilly, an inmate
victim must first comply with and exhaust all administrative procedures
within the prison. 149 It is useful to examine Michigan's correctional policy
as an example of the proper internal processes and procedures to report
sexual assault and trigger an internal investigation.5 0 To comply with the
administrative requirements for reporting a sexual assault by staff in a
Michigan prison, an inmate must fill out and file a "grievance." 5 However,
before an inmate can submit the grievance, she must first confront the abuser
and try to resolve the issue or provide a reason why confrontation is not
possible. 15 2 Once submitted, the prison grievance coordinator may deny the
146. See BJS STATISTICS 2011, supra note 17, at 8. It should be noted that female officers
working in both men's and women's prisons have also been found to be involved in sexual
misconduct. See James W. Marquart, Maldine B. Barnhill, & Kathy Balshaw-Biddle, Fatal
Attraction: An Analysis ofEmployee Boundary Violations in a Southern Prison System, 18 JUST. Q.
877, 889 (2001). About half of all verified staff sexual misconduct is perpetrated by female staff
members guarding male inmates. Id.
147. See Samiera Saliba, Rape by the System: The Existence and Effects of Sexual Abuse of
Women in United States Prisons, 10 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 293, 299, 304-06, 312 (2013)
(citing BJS STATISTICS 2011, supra note 17, at 2).
148. See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
149. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (2013) ("No action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted."). See generally
Robin L. Dull, Understanding Proper Exhaustion: Using the Special-Circumstances Test to Fill the
Gaps Under Woodford v. Ngo and Provide Incentives for Effective Prison Grievance Procedures,
92 IOWA L. REV. 1929 (2007).
150. See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
151. MI DEP'T OF CORR., POLICY DIRECTIVE: PRISONER/PAROLEE GRIEVANCES 3 (July 9, 2007),
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/03_02_130_200872_7.pdf.
152. See id. at 2.
A grievance also may be rejected for any of the following reasons: ... [t]he grievant did
not attempt to resolve the issue with the staff member involved prior to filing the
grievance unless prevented by circumstances beyond his/her control or if the issue falls
within the jurisdiction of the Internal Affairs Division in Operations Support
Administration.
Id.
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grievance for administrative reasons (i.e., it is deemed vague, illegible,
duplicative, untimely, or contains more than one issue).15 These
administrative denials may thwart reporting from the outset. 1 4 One inmate
recounts, "[f]inally, in 2001, after about a year of [retaliation], the abuse got
so bad that I decided to say something. I told the counselors, and they had
me file a grievance against him, but the warden rejected it. They said I
hadn't done it in a timely manner."
The nature of the closed system means that when abuse happens, the
victim is often still forced to interact with and be subject to supervision from
her abuser for the duration of her sentence.16 As best summarized by a
woman who was abused in prison: "Imagine being raped inside a stranger's
house and being confined to that stranger's house for months afterwards,
even years." 1 Much of the prison population is undereducated on
prohibited behavior and may not understand how to utilize the reporting
system, especially because it is full of complicated language and legalese. 5
An inmate may not identify what transpired as abuse.15 9 One woman noted
she "wasn't aware there was anything that could be done,"160 and another
seemed to carry notions of what abuse was from outside the closed system,
stating "I do not wish to press criminal charges against [the correction
officer]. I was not force [sic] into doing anything that I did not want to
do."1 6 1 The line between appropriate pat downs and inappropriate touching,
appropriate supervision and privacy violations, and appropriate interaction
153. Id.
154. See Saliba, supra note 147, at 306 (explaining that one of the impediments to reporting abuse
is "the feeling that staff would .. .do nothing about it").
155. ROBIN LEVI & AYELET WALDMAN, INSIDE THIS PLACE, NOT OF IT: NARRATIVES FROM
WOMEN'S PRISONS 65, 98 (1st ed. 2011).
156. See PREA COMMISSION REPORT 2009, supra note 98, at 45.
157. Interview with Inmate #13 (on file with author). The PREA attempted to address this issue
with policies that bar a time limit on sexual-abuse grievances. See 28 C.F.R. § 115.52(b)(1) (2012)
("The agency shall not impose a time limit on when an inmate may submit a grievance regarding an
allegation of sexual abuse.").
158. See infra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Hope H. & Brenda L., "This Is Happening in Our Country": Two Testimonials of
Survivors of Prison Rape, 42 HARv. C. R-C. L. L. REV. 89, 93 (2007) ("The biggest obstacle in
reporting the abuse was my own complete shock at what had happened to me. My own disbelief at
what had happened, wanting to deny being raped by a corrections officer, an old salt-and-pepper
man who could have been my uncle.").
160. Interview with Inmate #5 (on file with author).
161. Interview with Inmate #9 (on file with author).
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and overfamiliarity is extremely difficult to understand and navigate.1 6 2
Finally, due to the lack of sexual relationships and the complicated dynamics
of sexuality in prison, a victim may feel she is giving consent or
consensually seeking the relationship, and thus, be disinclined to report such
instances.16 This is evidenced by a victim's own account, "I wanted a
relationship with this officer b/c I thought it would make me happy and this
is what people did in prison." 16 4
These examples reflect just some of the very significant barriers to
reporting inside the closed system of prison, operating both formally and
informally.16 5 They include the structure of the policies themselves, feelings
of shame or guilt, a fear of not being believed, rape myth and victim
blaming, and fear of retaliation or punishment.1 6 6 Some barriers unique to
the closed prison environment may impact one's willingness to report;
including time served, sexual orientation, or other demographic variables. 16 7
"[A]dditional consequences, like retaliation or additional labels of being
'weak,' which could lead to increased harassment by other inmates" are
significant deterrents to reporting.168 Anecdotal evidence shows there are
great risks that accompany reporting, and many women do not want to
"cause trouble" and risk extending their release date: "I couldn't tell anyone.
My appeal was still in the courts, and I wanted to go home."1 6 9 One woman
was told if she pursued reporting the abuse she would "see her max date." 170
If an inmate overcomes the barriers associated with reporting, she will
likely encounter a separate set of challenges involved with investigating a
claim of sexual assault in prison, particularly if the allegation is against
162. See Flesher, supra note 132, at 865 (explaining the difficulties in cross-gender inmate
supervision).
163. See OWEN ET AL., supra note 129, at v-viii.
164. Interview with Inmate #12 (on file with author).
165. See generally Brenner et al., supra note 131.
166. See Shannon K. Fowler, Would They Officially Report an in-Prison Sexual Assault? An
Examination of Inmate Perceptions, 90 PRISON J. 220, 224-25 (2010); Brenner et al., supra note
131.
167. See Fowler, supra note 166, at 225. Further, sexual orientation and certain demographic
variables such as race, education, and previous incarceration may help predict whether an inmate
would report. Id.
168. See id. at 229.
169. LEVI & WALDMAN, supra note 155, at 97.
170. Interview with Inmate #14 (on file with author).
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correctional staff. 17 An internal investigator interviews the victim,
perpetrator and witnesses, and assesses evidence. 172  Although policies
provide that "[a]ll investigations shall be conducted promptly, thoroughly
and objectively" and should refer to the PREA for guidance, 173 the
investigator has wide discretion, which often goes unchecked.1 7 4  The
findings of an investigation are integral: they may result in discipline for the
perpetrator if found guilty, or, in many cases, discipline for the victim if the
claim is found to be untrue.17 5
PREA-inspired research reveals that "just [seventeen] percent of all
allegations of sexual violence, misconduct, and harassment investigated in
2006" were substantiated. 17 6 The Bureau of Justice Statistics further reports
that investigators concluded that in twenty-nine percent of the alleged
incidents, there was no sexual assault. 1 7 7 In over half of the incidents, they
could not conclusively determine if abuse actually occurred. 17  It is
important to note that the high numbers of "unsubstantiated" findings-
those where the investigators could not determine if the abuse occurred-is
not necessarily attributable to a high number of false allegations. 179
Acknowledging these barriers, steps have been made in many prisons to
remedy these procedures and make them easier for victims to use. For
example, under PREA, some prisons have changed their policies and allow a
victim to report to any correctional staff as well as providing a way to report
abuse to a public or private entity, and requiring staff to report any
knowledge, suspicion, or information regarding sexual abuse.180 Some
171. See Fowler, supra note 166, at 229; PREA COMviISSION REPORT 2009, supra note 98, at 101.
172. See MICH. DEP'T OF CORR., POLICY DIRECTIVE: PROHIBITED SEXUAL CONDUCT INVOLVING
PRISONERS, supra note 139, at 6.
173. Id. at 5.
174. See PREA COMMISSION REPORT 2009, supra note 98, at 188.
175. See id. at 122-23; see also Michael Rigby, Michigan's Dirty Little Secret: Sexual Abuse of
Female Prisoners Pervasive, Ongoing, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.
prisonlegalnews.org/news/2006/j an/i 5/michigans-dirty-little-secret-sexual-abuse-of-female-prisoner
s-pervasive-ongoing/.
176. PREA COMMISSION REPORT 2009, supra note 98, at 13.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. Id. at l18.
180. See 28 C.F.R. § 115.51(a) (2014) (stating that "[t]he agency shall provide multiple internal
ways for inmates to privately report sexual abuse and sexual harassment"). In addition,
[t]he agency shall also provide at least one way for inmates to report abuse or harassment
to a public or private entity or office that is not part of the agency, and that is able to
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prisons also allow a victim to file a grievance without submitting it to the
staff member who is the subject of the complaint; a requirement that is an
improvement from, and at odds with, Michigan's policy of requiring an
inmate to try and resolve the issue face-to-face before she may submit a
grievance.
Despite the existence of laws like the PREA, certain elements inherent
in the structure of the closed prison system may make it so that a
"substantiated" finding for a sexual-abuse claim is near impossible.1 8 2 The
power imbalance between inmate and staff, presumptions about character
and credibility,1 8 3 rape myths, discretion in investigation, and a culture of
protection and acceptance among correctional staff all contribute to the
difficulty for an inmate to find justice through an investigation.1 4
The power imbalance between inmates and correctional staff is
extreme."' Corrections officers may utilize this imbalance to facilitate
abuse,1 86 to ensure inmates do not report, 1 8 7 and to ensure investigations do
receive and immediately forward inmate reports of sexual abuse and sexual harassment to
agency officials, allowing the inmate to remain anonymous upon request. Inmates
detained solely for civil immigration purposes shall be provided information on how to
contact relevant consular officials and relevant officials at the Department of Homeland
Security.
28 C.F.R. § 115.51(b) (2014). Finally, 28 C.F.R. § 115.61(a)-staff and agency reporting duties,
requires
[t]he agency shall require all staff to report immediately and according to agency policy
any knowledge, suspicion, or information regarding an incident of sexual abuse or sexual
harassment that occurred in a facility, whether or not it is part of the agency; retaliation
against inmates or staff who reported such an incident; and any staff neglect or violation
of responsibilities that may have contributed to an incident or retaliation.
181. 28 C.F.R. § 115.52(c). "(1) An inmate who alleges sexual abuse may submit a grievance
without submitting it to a staff member who is the subject of the complaint, and (2) Such grievance
is not referred to a staff member who is the subject of the complaint." Id.
182. See generally PREA COMMIssioN REPORT 2009, supra note 98.
183. See, e.g., Hope H. & Brenda L., supra note 159, at 91.
The shift captain was suspicious, and they took me to the hospital to do a rape kit, but he
had used a condom. I told the nurses what had happened, but nothing ever came of it.
The jail people said I was nuts because I had been hallucinating for days. But I didn't
hallucinate being raped. I was devastated.
Id. at 91.
184. See Brenner et al., supra note 131.
185. See ALL TOO FAMILIAR, supra, note 13.
186. See id.
Christina Kampfner, a clinical psychologist who had worked extensively with women in
Michigan's prisons, told us that in these relationships, officers often target "like a radar"
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not yield a substantiated finding for the allegation.8  In many cases,
investigators presume that an officer is inherently more credible than an
inmate or may assume that the inmate "deserved" the abuse.1 89 One
inmate-victim explained the common (but mythic) assumption that "all the
women in here want sex . . . [T]hey will do anything to get it."190
Correctional officers have the power to write misconduct tickets for a range
of inmate behaviors that do not require proof; these charges can range from
being out of place (or not where they are supposed to be at a given time) to
the broader "insolence" charge, which can encompass any behavior
perceived by correctional staff as insolent.19 1 In addition, these tickets can
later be used to cast doubt on an inmate victim's motives for reporting
abuse. "It is believed that the prisoner's allegation was in retribution for
misconduct tickets written by [the correctional officer]."19 2 One woman
discussed this horrific tactic, used by her correction officer perpetrator,
where in a letter to her, her abuser apologized for being rude to her and
writing her a ticket and explains that he was trying to throw others off the
women with histories of sexual or physical abuse or prisoners in emotionally vulnerable
positions, such as those who lack support from family or friends, who are alienated or
isolated by other prisoners or staff, and younger women who are incarcerated for the first
time.
Id.
187. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, NOWHERE TO HIDE: RETALIATION AGAINST WOMEN IN MICHIGAN
STATE PRISONS (1998), http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/women/ [hereinafter NOWHERE TO
HIDE].
188. See PREA COMMISSION REPORT 2009, supra note 98. During interviews, perpetrators may
fabricate reasons why the inmate is lying, and the internal investigator defers to the credibility of
staff. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. One women's investigation file stated, "[t]he
grievant has failed to provide any substantive evidence to support the claims. Therefore, this Office
must rely on the credibility of staff." Interview with Inmate #28 (on file with author).
189. Mary Sigler, By the Light of Virtue: Prison Rape and the Corruption of Character, 91 IOWA
L. REV. 561, 581 (2006); Tricia Zunker, Changing the Policy of Prisoner-Cide in America:
Providing Access to Condoms, 5 Nw. INTERDISC. L. REV. 39, 72 (2012). Half of those questioned in
one survey stated that "society accepts prison rape as 'part of the price criminals pay for
wrongdoing."' Charles M. Sennott, Poll Finds Wide Concern About Prison Rape; Most Favor
Condoms for Inmates, BOS. GLOBE, May 17, 1994, at 22.
190. Interview with Inmate #10, (on file with author).
191. Discipline-Prisoner Discipline, MICH. DEP'T CORR., https://www.michigan.gov/
corrections/0,4551,7-119-9741_12798-292458--,00.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2017). "Insolence-
Words, actions, or other behavior [that] is intended to harass, degrade, or cause alarm in an
employee." Id.; see also MICH. DEP'T OF CORR., POLICY DIRECTIVE: PRISONER DISCIPLINE (Apr. 9,
2012), http://www.michigan.gov/corrections/0,4551,7-119-9741_12798-292458--,00.html.
192. Interview with Inmate #26 (on file with author).
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track of the love letters he was writing her.193
The closed system creates a strong, almost fraternal bond between
correctional staff and facilitates a culture of silence about abuse across the
spectrum of reporting and investigation. 19 4 "It's like if you fall out with one
officer, you fall out with all of them."19 5 Correctional staff tends to protect
each other, a dynamic that may interfere with their ability to conduct
impartial, fair investigations.1 9 6
The ADW had his friends threaten me before the investigation.
They told me that if I kept quiet I wouldn't be retaliated against, I
would be left alone. They said I'd be able to go home, but if the
investigation continued, he'd lose his job, and then everybody
would come down on me. I was afraid, and I lied to the
investigators, told them nothing was happening, that the ADW was
just my boss, a good friend. 197
2. Immigration Detention Facilities
Individuals "held in the U.S. immigration detention system experience
sexual victimization from both fellow detainees and detention facility
employees," similar to that which occurs in prison.1 9 8 "The extent of such
abuse is unknown due to discretionary reporting requirements and fear
amongst the detainees."19 9 As a threshold matter, better data collection is
needed.
The Department of Homeland Security set forth standards addressing
sexual victimization to comply with President Obama's directive to
implement the PREA. 20 0 However, there are no real enforceable rules for
these closed systems. 201 The standards focus on preventing staff-on-detainee
193. Interview with Inmate #8 (on file with author).
194. See BRENDA V. SMITH & JAIME M YARussI, NAT'L INST. OF CORR., BREAKING THE CODE OF
SILENCE 11-12 (2007), https://nicic.gov/library/022473.
195. Interview with Inmate #20 (on file with author).
196. See SMITH & YAARUSSI, supra note 194.
197. LEVI & WALDMAN, supra note 155, at 98.
198. Grace Trueman, Pocketing a Pretty Penny: Sexual Victimization, Human Rights, and Private
Contractors in the U.S. Immigration Detention System, 89 U. DET. MERCYL. REV. 339, 340 (2012).
199. Id.
200. See 6 C.F.R. § 115 (2014).
201. See Anshu Budhrani, Regardless ofMy Status, IAm a Human Being: Immigrant Detainees
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sexual abuse, which is defined as any sexual contact between a detainee and
any staff member, volunteer, or contractor.202 "Improper medical searches
and the attempts to coerce a detainee into engaging in sexual contact are
considered sexual abuse. The standards also focus on preventing detainee-
on-detainee sexual abuse . . . through coercion, intimidation, or force,"
which is an expansion beyond what the PREA contemplates in this
context. 20 3
Experts have only recently exposed sexual violence as a significant
problem in immigration detention centers.2 0 4  As populations in these
settings grow, so do the number of allegations. 2 05 However, much like in
prison and the military, the number of actual victimizations is likely far
higher than the reports of abuse.2 0 6 Immigration and Custom Enforcement's
data system reflected "215 allegations of sexual abuse and assault from
October 2009 through March 2013 in facilities that had over 1.2 million
admissions."2 0 7 This data should be viewed cautiously because the "ICE
data did not include all reported allegations."208 The extent to which abuses
are occurring in detention centers has remained largely under the radar.2 0 9
However, in 2009, the PREA Commission detailed abuses in detention
centers, identifying the population as particularly vulnerable, and in 2010,
the Human Rights Watch issued a report on these abuses. 21 0 From these
sources, the descriptions of sexual abuse in detention centers are eerily
andRecourse to the Alien Tort Statute, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 781, 783 (2012). "Additionally, while
the Obama Administration has announced an overhaul of the immigration detention system, it has
concurrently refused to create legally binding rules, arguing that 'rule-making would be laborious,
time-consuming and less flexible' than a simple overhaul." Id.
202. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., STANDARDS TO PREVENT, DETECT, AND RESPOND TO
SEXUAL ABUSE AND ASSAULT IN CONFINEMENT FACILITIES 27 (2012), http://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/prea-nprm-final-120612.pdf.
203. Mufioz, supra note 4, at 569.
204. See Detained and at Risk, supra note 13.
205. See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-38, IMMIGRATION DETENTION:
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS COULD STRENGTHEN DHS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS SEXUAL ABUSE 3 (2013),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659146.pdf [hereinafter IMMIGRATION DETENTION].
206. See Detained and at Risk, supra note 13; IMMIGRATION DETENTION, supra note 205.
207. IMMIGRATION DETENTION, supra note 205.
208. Id.
209. See supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
210. See PREA COMMISSION REPORT 2009, supra note 98, at 175-81 (2009); Detained and at
Risk, supra note 13.
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similar to both prison and the military.2 1  The abuses and dynamics mirror
the imbalanced power relationships-including threats, retaliation, not being
believed, reporting and being ignored, reporting and not being sustained-
with the added dynamic of deportation and removal.2 1 2  Just as in prison,
other detainees, as well as guards or staff, perpetrate abuse; and, while
outside the scope of this paper, abuses against children are shockingly
widespread.2 1 3
The closed nature of the immigration detention system represents a
hybrid of the many problems seen in reporting, investigation, and retaliation
in prison and the military.2 1 4  In 2010, Human Rights Watch extensively
studied these abuses, concluding that the growing abuse has "quietly
emerged as a pattern across the rapidly expanding national immigration
detention system." 21 5  Thus, while abuse is a burgeoning issue in this
context, it bears similarities to other closed institutional systems, and
therefore the suggestions for remedying it are very similar. There is
potential to address the practices in these immigration centers before the
problem becomes as institutionally entrenched as in other systems like
prisons and the military.
ICE policies governing sexual abuse and assault mirror those in the
PREA context, setting forth a zero-tolerance scheme barring even
"consensual" sexual contact. 216 "Sexual abuse and assault of a detainee by a
staff member, contractor, or volunteer" encompasses a range of behaviors
211. See PREA COMMIssioN REPORT 2009, supra note 98, at 175-81.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 178.
Allegations of sexual abuse started surfacing, and among those cases was an eight-year-
old boy from El Salvador who was raped and sexually abused. Bryan Johnson, the
immigration attorney representing the boy, explained how ICE officials did very little to
stop the abuse. He came from his home country with his mother and younger brother.
After arriving in the United States, the family was placed in the detention facility. Days
after their arrival, the eight-year-old boy was raped by an older boy. The abuse occurred
in the facility's game room and bathroom, areas not supervised by officials. The child's
mother reported the incident to ICE officials; however, the officials told her there was
nothing they could do.
Mufioz, supra note 4, at 580.
214. See supra notes 198-213 and accompanying text.
215. Detained and at Risk, supra note 13.
216. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 11062.2: SEXUAL ABUSE AND ASSAULT
PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION ¶¶ 2, 3.3 (May 22, 2014), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-
reform/pdf/saapi2.pdf [hereinafter ICE ABUSE AND PREVENTION].
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from "[c]ontact between the penis and the vulva or anus and . . . contact
involving the penis upon penetration, however slight" to "[v]oyeurism,
which is defined as the inappropriate visual surveillance of a detainee for
reasons unrelated to official duties." 2 17 Further, ICE policy addresses the
prevention of retaliation against those who report sexual abuse, provides for
confidentiality, and mandates training for investigating sexual abuse.2 18
The power dynamics of abuse by a guard in a detention center against a
detainee are very similar to the patterns seen in the other closed systems.219
The guard is in a higher position of power than a detainee, similar to a
guard-inmate and a military victim-higher officer relationship.2 2 0
Perpetrators utilize their high status in the closed system to facilitate abuse:
"The guard [] dragged the victim into the guard's bathroom and engaged in
intercourse with her." 2 21  The same type of coercion seen in the prison
context occurs in immigration facilities where "deportation officers have
propositioned women whose cases they control, telling them that if they
want to be released they need to comply with the officers' sexual
demands."2 2 2
Detainees in immigration centers, like prisoners, are a group particularly
vulnerable to sexual abuse. 223 They may have a higher likelihood than the
general public of having experienced sexual abuse prior to their detention,
especially if they are asylum seekers or survivors of torture in their home
224
countries. Detainees "often have posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
and other trauma responses," which include "difficulty problem-solving and
a sense of hopelessness and lack of control, all of which make individuals
more susceptible to sexual victimization and also less likely to report it." 225
Reporting sexual abuse and assault in immigration centers is usually
accomplished internally through facility grievance policy and procedures-
217. Id. at 2-3.
218. Id. at 8-9.
219. See infra notes 220-22.
220. See Brenner et al., supra note 131.
221. Mufnoz, supra note 4, at 574-77.
222. PREA COMMIssIoN REPORT 2009, supra note 98, at 179.
223. Id. at 177 (stating that "[m]any factors-personal and circumstantial, alone or in
combination-make immigration detainees especially vulnerable to sexual abuse").
224. Id. at 178.
225. Id.
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much like the process in prisons.226 Although there is an option to report
externally, for example, "directly to ... the DHS [Department of Homeland
Security's] Office of Inspector General," an audit of detention facilities
showed that most detainees were not aware of these options.2 2 7 The PREA
Commission recommended standards to educate detainees on their rights and
options, but many informal barriers persist.228
Detainees, like prisoners, have concerns that no one will believe them if
they report and that such efforts will be futile; and they are fearful of
retaliation. 2 29 They also face unique barriers, such as a lack of information
about rules governing staff conduct, difficulty accessing reporting avenues,
language barriers, and the possible trauma from prior abuse.2 3 0 Much like in
prison, if a victim considers reporting, she is reminded of her inferior status
in the closed system and often internalizes the message that "nobody would
believe her," 23 1 or the victim even may be threatened, perhaps with physical
violence.2 3 2 Upon reporting, system actors may reiterate that sexual abuse is
trivial; they are not incentivized to do anything about it.233  One detainee
reflects, "it was useless to complain." 23 4 Additionally, just as in prisons,
verbal sexual harassment is so pervasive that it seems it is just part of the
culture that they must accept.23 5 The futility of reporting is illustrated by the
lack of response from the system; one "victim reported the abuse
immediately after the incident occurred; however, the guard continued to
226. See ABA COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION, COMPLAINT PROCESSES FOR IMMIGRATION DETAINEES
(2014), http://www.immigrantwomennetwork.org/Resources/Complaint Processes_Immig Detain
ees.pdf. See ICE ABUSE AND PREVENTION, supra note 216.
227. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., TREATMENT OF IMMIGRATION
DETAINEES HOUSED AT IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT FACILITIES 33 (2006),
https://ia601902.us.archive.org/18/items/241267-treatment-of-immigration-detainees-housed-at/241
267-treatment-of-immigration-detainees-housed-at.pdf (explaining how detention facilities fail to
explain the process for reporting abuse allegations).
228. See PREA COMMIssioN REPORT 2009, supra note 98, at 177-78.
229. See Mufioz, supra note 4, at 575.
230. See id. at 566.
231. Id. at 575.
232. See id. "He threatened her that if she told anyone, she would not leave Willacy alive." Id. at
580.
233. See PREA COMMIssioN REPORT 2009, supra note 98, at 188.
234. Munoz, supra note 4, at 575.
235. See SUNITA PATEL & TOM JAWETZ, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES 1, 10 (2007), https://www.aclu.org/
files/pdfs/prison/unsr briefing materials.pdf.
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work at Willacy for eight more months. It took two years for the guard to be
indicted." 23 6
Fear of punishment or fear of the system itself not only renders the
detainees vulnerable to abuse, but almost guarantees they won't report.2 3 7
The PREA Commission acknowledges that "[b]ecause immigration
detainees are confined by the agency with the power to deport them, officers
have an astounding degree of leverage, especially when detainees are not
well informed of their rights and access to legal counsel."2 3 8 Cheryl Little,
an attorney at the Haitian Refugee Center, noted that "[a] lot of women ...
don't feel they can question sexual demands by guards. Basically they are at
the mercy of their offenders."2 3 9
Those who do report may be labeled as "troublemakers" 2 40 or face
retaliation: "some of the women who have given statements have either been
,241transferred or deported to their countries. While in prison, women may
resign themselves to accept abuse, and in immigration centers, the
consequences are potentially more far-reaching, because it may mean giving
up their fight to remain in the US. 2 42 One woman, to avoid further abuse,
consented to being deported back to Canada, where she currently resides,
despite the fact that she had children living in the U.S. 2 43
Grievance procedures may seem "impossibly complex, especially for
detainees who speak languages other than English or Spanish" because they
often do not receive information regarding abuse reporting in a language
they can understand.2 4 4  Additionally, cultural proscriptions or fears of
stigma may impact the willingness to report.2 4 5
Investigations in detention centers often lead nowhere and result in little
236. Munoz, supra note 4, at 575.
237. See PREA COMMISSION REPORT 2009, supra note 98, at 22.
238. Id. at 22.
239. STOP PRISONER RAPE, supra note 18, at 4. "Immigrants are amongst the most vulnerable of
populations; not only are they almost always unable to exert their rights in this context, but these
remote immigration detention centers often deprive them of access to legal counsel." Munoz, supra
note 4, at 578.
240. Munoz, supra note 4, at 175.
241. PREA COMMISSION REPORT 2009, supra note 111, at 179.
242. Id. at 22.
243. Munoz, supra note 4, at 575.
244. PREA COMMISSION REPORT 2009, supra note 98, at 23.
245. See id. at 180 (stating that "[i]n many cultures, families and communities view victims of
sexual assault very unsympathetically after the abuse becomes known").
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if any action.2 46 In 2014, an American Immigration Council report analyzed
approximately 800 complaints alleging Border Patrol misconduct.2 4 7  The
report indicated that between January 2009 and January 2012, roughly 97%
of grievances inspected by internal investigators were deemed to have "No
Action Taken." 248 For allegations of sexual victimization, the numbers are
less clear, but likely reflect the same trend.24 9 For example, in one detention
center with more sexual assault complaints than any other facility of its kind,
the internal grievance process resolved only four of the nine hundred
complaints.2 5 0  The personnel involved in those incidents were not
disciplined nor was any corrective action taken; this demonstrates how little
external criminal recourse is available to victims. 251
Thwarting success rates of these investigations are cover-ups and codes
252
of silence surrounding internal system actors.22 Internal actors investigating
allegations of sexual abuse may be disincentivized to report findings that
sustain the claim. 253 "A former transportation guard at the Willacy facility,
Sigrid Adameit, explained that cover-ups for sexual abuse and physical
assault allegations were pervasive," and one employee was "advised not to
say anything about the alleged sexual assault. "254 One guard in New York
routinely verbally sexually harassed detainees, but when they complained,
"the [facility] tour commander and security chief dismissed the concerns,
246. See infra notes 247-57 and accompanying text.
247. See Daniel Martinez et al., No Action Taken: Lack of CBP Accountability in Responding to
Complaints of Abuse, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 1 (May 2014), https://www.americanimmigration
council.org/sites/default/files/research/No%/`20Action%/`2OTakenFinal.pdf.
248. Munoz, supra note 4, at 583-84.
249. See Martinez et al., supra note 247, at 4-6. The numbers are unclear because while the types
of complaints are divided, there are no statistics about the percentage of each type that ended with
"No Action Taken." Id.
250. See Munoz, supra note 4, at 578.
251. See Martinez et al., supra note 247, at 2-4.
252. See PREA COMMIssioN REPORT 2009, supra note 98, at 66, 83-84.
253. See id. at 83-84.
254. Munoz, supra note 4, at 576-77.
Sigrid recounted the time a manager requested her to transport a female detainee. When
Sigrid picked her up at the facility, the detainee was receiving a rape kit. The manager
instructed Sigrid to find a flight for the detainee to her native country. Amongst the
instructions, Sigrid was advised not to say anything about the alleged sexual assault.
Sigrid was to transport the detainee to the airport, where she would meet U.S. Marshals.
Id. at 576.
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stating that [the officer] was crazy and that they could not help."2 5 5 In that
256
case, the grievance filed never received a response.
There is a dearth of research on internal investigations in immigration
facilities, but the lack of appropriate investigatory response or failure to
award punishment following an investigation may deter reporting by
illustrating that a claim is essentially viewed as unimportant or trivial.2 57 In
1998, an officer from the Immigration and Naturalization Service's Office of
Internal Audit was assigned to a sexual abuse investigation but responded
that it was "just another person making false accusations against
Immigration." 25 8  Not only was no disciplinary action taken, but when the
incident was mentioned at a meeting, one supervisory official began to
laugh. 25 9 After one report, "the perpetrator was allowed back into her cell
where he raped her again." 26 0 Even when a guard is found guilty of sexual
assault, often there is no criminal prosecution.2 6 1
B. The Prevalence and Incidence ofSexual Violence in the Military
Like in the prison context, the problem of sexual violence in the military
was also recently illuminated in myriad contexts, ranging from
Congressional hearings, 26 2 to documentary films, 26 3 to mainstream news
255. Detained and at Risk, supra note 13, at 12-13.
256. See id.
257. See id. at 3-4.
258. STOPPRISONERRAPE, supra note 18, at 4.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 5. Two rapes were committed by an INS officer against Christina Madrazo-a pre-
operative transgender detainee at Krome. Id.
261. See Detained and at Risk, supra note 13 (stating that "an investigation into an alleged assault
of a detainee from Mexico by a private security guard [] led to his firing but did not result in
prosecution"). In 2007, a legislative amendment was finally passed to extend the portion of the
criminal code that criminalizes sexual contact between guards and prisoners into the detention
context. Id.
262. See The Relationships Between Military Sexual Assault, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and
Suicide, and on Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Treatment and
Management of Victims of Sexual Trauma: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of Pers. of the S. Comm.
on Armed Services, 113th Cong. (2014); Sexual Assaults in the Military: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. of Pers. of the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 113th Cong. (2013); Invisible Wounds:
Examining the Disability Compensation Benefits Process for Victims of Military Sexual Trauma:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and Mem'1 Affairs (DAMA4) of the H. Comm.
on Veteran'sAffairs, 112th Cong. (2012).
263. See THE INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 9.
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media, 26 4 to the highly acclaimed television show Scandal.26 5
A bleak reality for service members in the United States is that the risk
of experiencing sexual victimization in the military is significantly higher
than dying in combat. 26 6 "Female soldiers today are 180 times more likely
to be sexually assaulted by a fellow soldier than killed by an enemy."2 6 7
Rates of sexual victimization are twice as high in the military than in the
civilian context, but similarly and potentially even more problematically,
obtaining accurate statistics is more difficult. 268  Research shows that 6,131
individuals reported incidents of sexual victimization to the military in the
2014 fiscal year (October 2013 to September 2014), an 11% increase from
2013.269 However, this statistic does not tell the full story, and a 2013
Pentagon report found that that the number of people sexually assaulted in
the military was closer to 26,000.270 This number rose sharply from the
19,000 incidents reported in 2010.271
The 2014 Department of Defense (DoD) Report to the President of the
United States on SAPR reflects that of the total reports of sexual
victimization, 86% were perpetrated by service members.2 7 2 The remaining
264. See generally Tom Vanden Brook, Insults to Injury: Military Sexual-Assault Victims Endure
Retaliation, USA TODAY (May 18, 2015, 6:02 A.M.), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2015/05/18/military-sexual-assault-retaliation/27395845/; Courtney Kube, Reports of Sexual
Assault in Military Increase Again, NBC NEWS (May 1, 2015, 3:19 P.M.), http://www.nbc
news.com/news/us-news/reports-sexual-assault-military-increase-again-n3 52156; Reports of Sexual
Assaults Spike at Military Academies, CBS NEWS (Jan. 8, 2016, 9:41 A.M.), http://www.
cbsnews.com/news/sexual-assault-reports-air-force-army-navy-military-academies-us/.
265. See Scandal: A Few Good Women (ABC television broadcast May 7, 2015).
266. See Megan N. Schmid, Combating a Different Enemy: Proposals to Change the Culture of
SexualAssault in the Military, 55 VILL. L. REV. 475, 475 (2010).
267. Schenck, supra note 56, at 579 (citing The Week Staff, The Military's Sexual Assault
Epidemic, WEEK (Mar. 31, 2013), http://theweek.com/articles/466100/militarys-sexual-assault-
epidemic).
268. Schmid, supra note 266, at 475.
269. See DOD ANNUAL REPORT FY14 (2015), supra note 15, at 41.
270. See DEP'T OF DEF. SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE, ANNUAL REPORT ON
SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY, fig.6 (2013), http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/
FY12_DoDSAPROAnnualReport on SexualAssault-VOLUMEONE.pdf [hereinafter DOD
ANNUAL REPORT FY12 (2013)]. A recent survey estimated that 26,000 service members (6.1% of
females and 1.2% of males) experienced at least one incident of sexual violence in the twelve
months prior to being surveyed. Id.
271. Id.
272. See DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON SEXUAL
ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE (2014), http://sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/fyl4potus/
fyl4_dod report topotus full repor.pdf [hereinafter DOD REPORT TO POTUS (2014)].
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victims were those who were not on active military duty, civilians in the
United States, or foreign nationals.2 73  This Article focuses exclusively on
sexual assaults between military service members; situations involving those
on the outside of the closed system present additional challenges and barriers
worth exploring, but they are outside the scope of this Article.
An important facet of this discussion is that most sexual assaults are
committed against enlisted service members by their superiors.2 7 4 The DoD
report further suggests that the typical sexual assault involves a junior
female enlistee assaulted by a more senior service member. 275 As one author
observes, "[n]ew recruits are expected to report any misconduct directly to
their chain of command, but reporting a sexual assault to the direct
commander is often not a viable option if this commander is also the
perpetrator of the sexual assault." 276  This power dynamic mirrors that of
detention facilities, where staff members exploit their power and sexually
victimize detainees, making reporting difficult.27 7
Although this Article focuses on the military in its entirety as a closed
institutional system as it relates to the problem of sexual victimization, it is
worth noting that there are significant distinctions among the various
branches. 278  For example, both men and women in the Air Force face a
significantly lower risk of sexual assault than any other branch in the
military. 279 The Air Force is cited frequently as a place that is not seen as a
hostile work environment; only twelve percent of women and three percent
280
of men experienced a sexually hostile work environment in the past year.
These rates are compared against twenty-seven percent of women in both the
273. See id.
274. See Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 66, at 342.
275. See id. at 348. "[Seventy-three] percent of victims were grades E1-E4, meaning that the vast
majority of the victims were either training or in their initial assignment .. . [and fifty-one] percent
of perpetrators also were grades E1-E4 and [twenty-eight] percent of perpetrators were sergeant
level or higher." Id. at 3 48-49.
276. Id. at 349.
277. See supra Part II.
278. See supra notes 279-83 and accompanying text.
279. See NAT'L DEF. RESEARCH INST., SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE U.S.
MILITARY: TOP-LINE ESTIMATES FOR ACTIVE-DUTY SERVICE MEMBERS FROM THE 2014 RAND
WORKPLACE STUDY 9-10 (2014) [hereinafter RAND WORKPLACE STUDY (2014)].
280. See id. at 10. Further exploration of this phenomenon would be a fascinating project for
scholars to take up.
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Navy and Marines.2 1 Those in the Navy face a significantly higher risk of
sexual victimization than any other branch in the military.2 8 2  Finally, the
percentage of penetrative assaults was the highest for both men and women
in the Marines. 28 3  Explanations for these differences are not widely
understood, but would be a fascinating topic for further research.
The military addresses crimes of sexual violence within its own system
of laws, specifically covering rape and sexual assault in article 120 of the
UCMJ. 28 4 The most recent revisions to this part of the UCMJ occurred in
2007. While reforms were generally welcomed, many argue they do not go
far enough, and the UCMJ is still subject to critique.285 "With the new
statute, Congress attempted to answer the criticism of the current rape
statute. However, the statute does not adequately address many of the
significant issues facing the Armed Forces in their attempt to eliminate
sexual assault in the military." 28 6
The UCMJ creates distinctions among different kinds of sexual violence
by defining and distinguishing what constitutes a "sex act" and "sexual
contact." 28 7 A sexual act is defined as:
(A) contact between the penis and the vulva or anus or mouth ...
[and] contact involving the penis occurs upon penetration, however
slight; or (B) the penetration, however slight, of the vulva or anus or
mouth of another by any part of the body or by an object, with an
intention to abuse, humiliate, harass, or degrade any person or to
288
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.
Sexual contact, by contrast, is defined as:
281. See id.
282. See id.
283. See id.
284. See UCMJ, supra note 72, at 145.
285. See Major Jennifer S. Knies, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Why the New UCMJ Rape
Law Missed the Mark, and How an Affirmative Consent Statute Will Put It Back on Target (Apr.
2007) (unpublished LL.M. Thesis) (on file with The Judge Advocate General's School United States
Army, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA519227). The author argues, instead, for a
consent-based statute. Id.
286. Id. at 4-5.
287. UCMJ, supra note 72.
288. UCMJ, supra note 72, at art. 201.
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(A) touching, or causing another person to touch, either directly or
through the clothing, the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh,
or buttocks of any person, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, or
degrade any person; or (B) any touching, or causing another person
to touch, either directly or through the clothing, any body part of
any person, if done with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person. Touching may be accomplished by any part of
the body.2 8 9
The Code includes four discrete categories of sexual victimization that
rest on whether a sexual act (rape and sexual assault) or sexual contact
(aggravated sexual contact and abusive sexual contact) was committed and
then how specifically the act or contact was carried out.29 0 These definitions
apply across the entire closed military system, but the Department of
Defense (DoD) requires every branch of the military to create its own sexual
assault response and prevention protocols.2 9 1
Widely publicized cases of sexual assault in the military inspired an
evolution in the way this problem is handled in the military.2 9 2  The
President, Congress, and military leaders have engaged in ongoing efforts to
improve responsiveness and more effective prevention.2 9 3 Media accounts
over the past decades also helped create major changes in policies and
practices related to sexual violence.2 9 4 In 1991, the famous Tailhook scandal
brought a pervasive culture of sexual harassment to the forefront.2 9 5 While
at a convention for over 5000 active, retired, and reserve Naval and Marine
Corps aviators in Las Vegas, men formed a "gauntlet" in a hotel corridor and
sexually victimized eighty-three women.2 96  Lieutenant Paula Coughlin
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. See Schenck, supra note 56 at 656-57 (describing the impact of Section 573(f) on the
varying branches of the military).
292. See generally Hannah Brenner, Beyond Seduction: Lessons Learned About Rape, Politics,
and Power from Dominique Strauss-Kahn and Moshe Katsav, 20 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 225 (2013)
(providing a comprehensive discussion on the impact of public cases).
293. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
294. See Neil A. Lewis, Tailhook Affair Brings Censure of 3 Admirals, N.Y. TImES (Oct. 16,
1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/16/us/tailhook-affair-brings-censure-of-3 -admirals.html.
295. Richard Chema, Arresting "Tailhook": The Prosecution of Sexual Harassment in the
Military, 140 MIL. L. REv. 1, 17 (1993).
296. Id.
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made the initial complaint, but an investigation revealed that many women
were victimized in the same way.2 97 In fact, the annual Tailhook convention
was well known for this culture of victimizing women.2 9 8 Many officers
retired or resigned due to pressure resulting from the scandal, including the
Secretary of the Navy, but two years after the incident none of the
perpetrators had been disciplined through the military. 29 9 Eventually, three
admirals were given letters of censure, and thirty other senior officers were
given letters of caution.30 0 These letters were not punitive in nature, but
"ma[de] some officers unlikely to win promotions or desirable postings."30
Some lower ranking officers were fined and disciplined-the numbers of
which are unknown-and most cases were dismissed for lack of evidence3 0 2
or other reasons before going to trial. Further, the officer in charge of the
sexual assault prevention program for the Air Force was arrested and
subsequently charged with sexual battery.30 3
In 1996, five years after Tailhook, another scandal erupted at the
Aberdeen Proving Grounds.3 0 4 In this context, a "rape ring" was identified
at an Army facility, perpetrated by officers onto trainees when over nineteen
women came forward and filed reports.3 0 5 Twenty officers were
investigated, but only three were charged criminally-and only two of those
included rape charges.3 0 6  During the prosecution, conspiracy among the
three men was not proven, but it can be inferred based on the re-
297. Id.
298. Norman Kempster, What Really Happened at Tailhook Convention: Scandal: The Pentagon
Report Graphically Describes How Fraternity-Style Hifinks Turned into a Hall ofHorrors, L.A.
TEIES (Apr. 24, 1993), http://articles.latimes.com/print/1993-04-24/news/mn-26672_1_tailhook-
convention.
299. See Chema, supra note 295, at 15; see also Kempster, supra note 298.
300. See Lewis, supra note 294.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. See Michael Winerip, Revisiting the Military's Tailhook Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (May 13,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/13/booming/revisiting-the-militarys-tailhook-scandal-video
.html?r-0.
304. See Schenck, supra note 56, at 587.
305. Id.; Newsweek Staff, Rape in the Ranks, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 24, 1996, 7:00 PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/rape-ranks-176260.
306. Jackie Spinner, In Wake of Sex Scandal, Caution Is the Rule at Aberdeen, WASH. POST
(Nov. 7, 1997), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/local/longterm/library/aberdeen/caution
.htm; United States v. Simpson, 58 M.J. 368 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
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victimization of the same female trainees.3 0 7
Yet another sexual assault scandal in the military occurred in the Air
Force in 2003, when over fifty former and then-current cadets came forward
with allegations of sexual assault and accusations of mishandling of previous
reporting of sexual assault. 308 Due to the time lapse between the assaults and
the proper investigations, there was only one cadet who was court-
martialed.3 09 Leadership at the academy was replaced in an effort to create a
culture of zero tolerance.31 0 These three examples represent just a fraction of
the cases brought into the public's purview. 31 1
All of these incidents, while devastating for the victims, ultimately
inspired changes in military law and policy related to sexual assault.3 1 2 In
2005, Congress ordered the Secretary of Defense to review the UCMJ to
determine what improvements could be made to address the response to
sexual victimization.3 1 3 As a result, a new version of Article 120, the section
that deals with rape and sexual assault, was circulated.3 1 4  Ultimately, the
documentary The Invisible War, released in 2012, gave a voice to many of
the victims of sexual violence, highlighted their struggles with reporting and
seeking justice, and generated media attention.3 1 5 Also in 2012,
Congresswoman Tsongas and Congressman Turner created the Military
Sexual Assault Prevention Caucus in an effort to develop solutions to the
issue of sexual assault in the military.3 1 6
The Victims Protection Act of 2014 amended the National Defense
Authorization Act; both Acts sought to reform policy and procedure to
307. Three Soldiers Arraigned in U.S. Army Sex Scandal, CNN (Dec. 6, 1996),
http://www.cnn.com/US/9612/06/aberdeen.arraign/.
308. See Eric Schmitt, Air Force Academy Investigated 54 Sexual Assaults in 10 years, N.Y.
TIES (Mar. 7, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/07/us/air-force-academy-investigated-54-
sexual-assaults-in-10-years.html.
309. Colleen Dalton, The Sexual Assault Crisis in the United States Air Force Academy, 11
CARDOZO WOIEN'S L.J. 177, 180-81 (2004); Esther Schrader, Air Force Cadet Is Charged with
Rape, L.A. TIMES (May 14, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/may/14/nation/na-academyl4.
310. Id. at 187.
311. See Schneck, supra note 68, at 579.
312. See infra notes 313-16 and accompanying text.
313. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 552,
119 Stat. 3136 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2006)) (amending UCMJ Article 120 by
adding provisions for rape, sexual assault, and other sexual misconduct offenses).
314. See UCMJ, supra note 72.
315. THE INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 9.
316. Id.
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prevent and reduce sexual assault in the military. 1 7 In particular, reforms to
Article 60 and Article 32 eliminate the commander's ability to modify
sentences or overturn a guilty verdict and set specific objectives for a
hearing including limiting the cross-examination of the victim if she chooses
to testify. 3 18
A major effort to overhaul the military response to sexual assault was
initiated in the proposed Gillibrand Amendment, or Military Justice
Improvement Act, which was introduced in Congress in 2013, but failed to
pass. 319 This proposed legislation sought to amend the UCMJ to modify the
process and alleviate some of the fears military sexual-assault victims face
when reporting sexual violence.3 2 0 In 2015, another reform effort occurred
in the context of the Military Justice Review Group, which, at the Secretary
of Defense's direction, performed a comprehensive review of the military
justice system. 3 21 That review resulted in a report proposing amendments to
the UCMJ in 2015.322 Most of this report focused on aspects of military
justice that are well outside the scope of this Article's focus, but one
317. See Victims Protection Act of 2014, S.1917, 113th Cong. (2014).
318. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 860, art. 60 (2014). The new Article 60
eliminates the commander's ability to modify sentences for serious offenses by overturning a guilty
verdict or reducing the finding of guilty to that of a lesser offense. Id. The new Article 32-
essentially a civilian preliminary hearing in which an Investigating Officer determines if there is
probable cause-sets specific and inclusive objectives to the hearing, and limits the cross-
examination of the victim, if the victim chooses to testify at all. Id.
319. Comprehensive Resource Center for the Military Justice Improvement Act, KIRSTEN
GILLIBRAND, http://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/mjia (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).
320. Id. Sponsored by Democratic New York Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand, the Act seeks to
[a]mend[] the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to direct the Secretaries of
Defense (DOD) and Homeland Security (DHS) to require the Secretaries of the military
departments to modify the process for determining whether to try by court-martial a
member accused of: (1) certain UCMJ offenses for which the maximum punishment
includes confinement for more than one year; or (2) a conspiracy, solicitation, or attempt
to commit such offenses.
S-2970 Military Justice Improvement Act of 2014, CONGRESS.GOV (Dec. 2, 2014),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2970 (summarizing the proposal). This
initiative, among others, would alleviate some of the fears that military sexual assault victims face
when reporting the crimes committed against them. See Comprehensive Resource Center for the
Military Justice Improvement Act, supra note 319.
321. See Military Justice Review Group, DEP'T DEF., http://ogc.osd.mil/mjrg.html (last visited
Apr. 17, 2017).
322. See MILITARY JUSTICE REVIEW GRP., DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE
REVIEW GROUP, PART I: UCMJ RECOMMVIENDATIONS 1 (2015), http://jpp.whs.mil/Public/docs/
03_Topic-Areas/0 1-General Information/09_MJRG Report PartlFinal_2 0 15 12 2 2 .pdf.
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important recognized recommendation, in limited extent, relates to the
power dynamic that exists between military recruiters and trainers and those
under their control.3 23  To this end, "Article 93a would cover military
recruiters and trainers who knowingly engage in prohibited sexual activity
with prospective recruits or junior members of the armed forces in initial
training environments. Consent would not be a defense to this offense."3 2 4
This statutory prohibition is similar to the ban on sexual relationships
between prison guards and inmates. 3 25
The military system of reporting sexual violence reveals the uniqueness
of the closed institutional setting; unlike in almost any other context,
military victims have two options of how to report: restricted or
unrestricted. 3 26  A restricted report allows a victim access to vital services
like medical treatment and counseling, a Sexual Assault Response
Coordinator (SARC) and chaplains; but it does not trigger an investigation
or any legal action.3 27 The SARC informs the commander that an assault has
occurred, but no details are disclosed to reveal the victim's identity.3 2 8 An
unrestricted report automatically triggers an investigation: notification is
provided to law enforcement, chain of command, and the SARC.3 2 9 If an
unrestricted report is made, the Military Criminal Investigative Organization
(MCIO) should be informed immediately, "regardless of the severity of the
allegations," 330 and per military policy, all adult-sexual-assault investigations
assumed by an MCIO will be investigated thoroughly and in compliance
with the respective DoD Instructions.3 3 1 If the investigation finds that the
323. Id. at 38.
324. Id. at 738.
325. Id. at 733-34.
326. See DOD ANNUAL REPORTFY12 (2013), supra note 270, at 17.
327. See id.
328. See id. at 17-18; see also Restricted Reporting, DEP'T DEF. SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION
& RESPONSE OFF., http://sapr.mil/index.php/restricted-reporting (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).
329. See DOD ANNUAL REPORT FY12 (2013), supra note 270, at 17.
330. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 5505.18, INVESTIGATION OF ADULT SEXUAL ASSAULT IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 1 (2013) (June 18, 2015) [hereinafter DOD INSTRUCTION 5505.18].
"Military criminal investigative organizations (MCIOs) will initiate investigations of all offenses of
adult sexual assault of which they become aware, as listed in the Glossary, that occur within their
jurisdiction regardless of the severity of the allegation." Id.
331. DEP'T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 5505.18: INVESTIGATION OF ADULT SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 6 (Mar. 22, 2017), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/
550518p.pdf; DEP'T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 5505.03: INITIATION OF INVESTIGATIONS BY DEFENSE
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE ORGANIZATIONS 5-7, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/
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allegation is substantiated, the commander possesses the power to take
action and may choose to do so in a judicial, nonjudicial, or administrative
process.3 3 2 If the case reaches the court-martial stage, military prosecutors
pursue a conviction under the UCMJ.3 3 3
Other scholars have sought to give voices to military victims of sexual
violence.3 3 4  This Article draws from their work and makes its own
observations that reflect three common themes that frequently emerge: the
report is trivialized or simply accepted as part of the culture of the military,
it is ignored altogether, or the reporter is punished or retaliated against.3 3 5
These themes in the military mirror those expressed by victims in detention
facilities.3 3 6 Over the past six years, it is estimated that fewer than 15% of
military sexual assault victims reported the matter to a military authority.
"Of the 4.3% of women who indicated experiencing unwanted sexual
contact in the past year and who reported the matter to a military authority or
organization, 62% perceived some form of professional or social retaliation,
administrative action, and/or punishment associated with their report." 338
If a victim of sexual violence chooses to report within the military, she
often receives no response, or her superiors deliver a message to just "deal
with it." 339 Even though policy mandates that the claims be taken seriously,
550503p.pdf (last updated Feb. 13, 2017); DEP'T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 5505.11: FINGERPRINT
CARD AND FINAL DISPOSITION REPORT SUBMISSION REQUIREMENTS 7, http://www.dtic.mil/
whs/directives/corres/pdf/55051 lp.pdf (last updated Mar. 30, 2017) [hereinafter DOD INSTRUCTION
5505.11]; DEP'T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 5505.14: DEOXYRIBONUCLEIC ACID (DNA) COLLECTION
REQUIREMENTS FOR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, LAW ENFORCEMENT, CORRECTIONS, AND
COMMANDERS 9, http://www.dtic.mil/ whs/directives/corres/pdf/550514p.pdf (last updated Mar. 9,
2017). The governing rules on the investigative process are outlined in the Department of Defense
Instruction Number 5505.18. See DOD INSTRUCTION 5505.18, supra note 330, at 1.
332. See DOD INSTRUCTION 5505.18, supra note 330, at 4.
333. See, e.g., DOD INSTRUCTION 5505.11, supra note 331, at 15.
334. See generally Alexandra Lohman, Silence of the Lambs: Giving Voice to the Problem of
Rape and SexualAssault in the United States Armed Forces, 10 Nw J. L. & SOC. POL'Y 230 (2015);
Deborah Rhode, Rape on Campus and in the Military: An Agenda for Reform, 23 UCLA WOMEN'S
L.. 1 (2016).
335. See Rhode, supra note 334, at 20-22; Lohman, supra note 334, at 236-37.
336. See Chandra Bozelko, Why We Let Prison Rape Go On, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/04/18/opinion/why-we-let-prison-rape-go-on.html?_r-0; Jesse Ellison, The
Military's Secret Shame, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 3, 2011), http://www.newsweek.com/militarys-secret-
shame-66459.
337. DOD ANNUAL REPORT FY14, supra note 15, at 10.
3 3 8. Id.
339. Complaint at 6, Klay v. Panetta, 758 F.3d 369 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 13-5081). "When Lt.
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in practice, one victim first received no response, and then superiors actively
discouraged her from seeking a rape kit-the evidence collection tool
commonly used in these crimes.340 In another case, when one woman
reported to "several supervising Sergeants in her Command about the
assault[, t]hey did nothing except tip her perpetrator off in advance that [she]
was going to file a report."341  Additionally, the Marine Corps ignored its
own protective order and forced the victimized soldier to be in formations
with her attacker.3 42 As an extreme example, Lieutenant (Lt.) Ariana Klay
was raped as punishment for reporting the abuse she endured, and she
eventually attempted to commit suicide.3 43 Lt. Helmer became the subject of
investigation and prosecution and was forced to leave the Marine Corps.3 44
In a similar vein, during an investigation, Command accused Navy
Seaman Apprentice Cummings of falsifying legal documents and statements,
then threatened that if she continued to try to prosecute, her sexual history
that she shared with her psychiatrist would be admitted.3 45 As part of the
informal military response, one woman was ostracized and assigned extra
duty; another was stopped from completing coursework and graduating.346
Human Rights Watch identified this trend of the military's punishment of
victims for minor "collateral misconduct" that only came to light because
they came forward to report sexual assault.3 47 The most worrying element of
this trend of retaliation is that commanders are aware of the harassment and
do nothing to stop it.3 48 The narratives of women who have been a part of
sexual-abuse investigations in the military reflect four general themes:
investigators' discretion in complying with policies, no real punishment-
even if the allegation is sustained, adoption of rape myths or victim blaming,
Klay reported the hostile environment to her Executive Officer, he refused to take any steps to stop
the open and pervasive hostility towards Lt. Klay and other females at the Marine Barracks, and
instead told Lt. Klay to 'deal with it."' Id.
340. Id. at 9.
341. Id. at 10.
342. Id. at 11.
343. See Complaint at 6, Klay, 758 F.3d 369 (No. 13-5081).
344. Id. at 9.
345. Id. at 14-15.
346. Id.
347. These collateral misconducts include underage drinking or adultery and serve as a powerful
deterrent to reporting. See Embattled, supra note 13.
348. Complaint at 14, Klay, 758 F.3d 369 (No. 13-5081).
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and obstruction from seeking justice.3 49
Investigators utilize a good amount of discretion in adhering to policy
during investigations.350 Lt. Helmer reported to the Navy Criminal
Investigative Service, and they initially refused to investigate, claiming that
her inability to recall the rape precluded the need for investigation; they
eventually "lost" her rape kit.3 5 1 Lieutenant Corporal (LCpL) McCoy,
"[d]espite findings by CID ... that her assailant was being brought to
justice, the Command used its unfettered power to shut down the
investigation without taking any action against the perpetrator."3 5 2 LCpL
Kalhe was denied proper policy and procedure during the investigation when
she was not offered any medical assistance or psychological counseling.3 5 3
And, like in many of the cases, no meaningful investigation was performed,
and no one inspected or preserved the crime scene or collected DNA
evidence.3 5 4  One perpetrator's superior even admitted that the NSIC
investigation was "woefully inadequate."3 5 5
Even if an investigation is properly performed, it often effectively
functions in a way that blames the victim. 356 Scholars examine the operation
of rape myths (including those that blame the victim) in numerous
contexts, 35 7 but a more in depth examination of how these rape myths
operate in the military is worthy of further study. 358 Lt. Klay reported that
she was told because she wore makeup and exercised in running shorts and
tank tops she "welcomed" the sexual harassment. 359 Hannah Sewell detailed
that she faced questions in her investigation about what she was wearing, if
349. See Embattled, supra note 13.
350. See infra notes 351-55 and accompanying text.
351. Complaint at 9, Klay, 758 F.3d 369 (No. 13-5081).
352. Id. at 11. McCoy's perpetrator and the people she reported to obstructed the investigation
and harassed McCoy; her perpetrator moved his room around to undercut her allegations and was
assisted by his supervisor. Id.
353. See id. at 12.
354. See id.
355. Id. at 9.
356. See infra notes 358-60 and accompanying text.
357. See Nisha Veerd, What Influences Victim Blaming in Rape? (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Nottingham) (on file at http://www.psychology.nottingham.ac.uk/staff/ddc/c8cxpa/
further/Dissertation examples/Veerd_15.pdf) (last visited Apr. 18, 2017) (defining "rape myths" as
a set of beliefs and attitudes that aim to condone male sexual aggression towards women).
358. See, e.g., Brenner et al., supra note 131; Russell Norton & Tim Grant, Rape Myth in True
and False Allegations, 14 PSYCHOL., CRIME, & L. 275 (Aug. 20, 2006).
359. Complaint at 6, Klay, 758 F.3d 369 (No. 13-5081).
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she had made a similar claim before, and about her boyfriend and sexual
history; ultimately, her credibility was questioned.3 6 0 Even the initial
responses to the Tailhook sexual abuses included victim-blaming sentiments
such as "that's what you get for walking down a hallway full of drunk
aviators."36
Perpetrators often face minimal or no punishment.3 6 2 "If you serve in
the U.S. military and you rape or sexually assault a fellow service member,
chances are you won't be punished. In fact, you have an estimated 86.5%
chance of keeping your crime a secret and a 92% chance of avoiding a court-
martial."3 63 In a particularly chilling outcome, some perpetrators are even
"rewarded" (Lt. Klay's rapists were featured in a nationally televised
recruitment commercial and in a Marine calendar).3 6 4 Although one of Lt.
Klay's rapists was court-martialed, he was not convicted of rape, and instead
faced charges of adultery and indecent language.3 6 5 Lt. Helmer reported that
the military removed her perpetrator from command but refused to press any
charges or take further steps to punish him; subsequently, the military
investigated her and forced her to leave the military.3 6 6  Her perpetrator
remains in good standing.3 67
360. THE INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 9.
3 6 1. Id.
362. See infra notes 363-67 and accompanying text.
363. Jackie Speier, Why Rapists in Military Get away with It, CNN (June 21, 2012, 8:19 A.M.),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/2 1/opinion/speier-military-rape/; see also DOD ANNUAL REPORT
FY12 (2013), supra note 270. This report indicates that in Fiscal Year 2012, there were 2661
subjects of investigations with disposition information to report, and of those, 1714 involved
subjects that could be considered for possible action by DOD; of those, 880 were substantiated, and
of those 880, only 594 had court martial preferred punishments. Id. The rest had nonjudicial
punishments, administrative discharges, or other adverse administrative actions. Id. at 68. But
within the court-martial proceedings, only 238 subjects were convicted, and their punishments
ranged from confinement, reduction in rank, fines and forfeitures, and discharge or dismissal. Id.
364. Complaint at 7, Klay, 758 F.3d 369 (No. 13-5081).
365. Id.
366. Id. at 9.
367. Id.
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III. CIVIL REMEDIES FOR VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN DETENTION AND
THE MILITARY
Sometimes it takes a different kind of action for change to
come-and sometimes that's a lawsuit.3 68
No simple solutions exist to stop sexual violence in prison, detention
centers, or the military. The passage of the PREA was certainly a start to
address abuse in both prisons and detention centers, but even the very
structure of the PREA's suggestions for change is criticized as ineffective.3 6 9
Further, the PREA does not create a private cause of action to allow external
enforcement of the standards. Critics argue that while higher levels of
prison surveillance and prosecutions of prison rapists are key aspects of the
PREA's agenda, sexual violence is an inherent characteristic of institutions
like prisons that discipline and punish, and the law is unlikely to eliminate
this coercion with more discipline and more punishment.3 7 0
Sexual violence reported in prison remains subject to problematic
investigatory practices.3 7 1 Some argue that the only viable solutions are to
reduce prison populations, 3 72 change community sexual-abuse-prevention
campaigns to promote economic sustainability to help women avoid their
entrance to prison altogether, or turn to insider organizations where feminists
and advocates work within mainstream institutions to combat sexual
abuse. 37 3
In detention centers, scholars express many of the same concerns with
the PREA and direct their suggestions toward restructuring detention centers
at a macro level-including a reevaluation of who should be in them in the
first place.3 7 4  Similarly, efforts in the military to reduce sexual violence
include legislative attention vis-a-vis the facilitation of Congressional
368. THE INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 9.
369. See Michelle VanNatta, Conceptualizing and Stopping State Sexual Violence Against
Incarcerated Women, 37 Soc. JUST. 27, 44 (2010-2011).
370. Id.
371. See ALL Too FAMILIAR, supra note 13.
372. See VanNatta, supra note 369, at 45; Alice Ristroph, Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUMB. J.
GENDER & L., 139, 146 (2006).
373. See VanNatta, supra note 369, at 45-46.
374. See generally Norma E. Loza, Abuse in Illinois Immigration Detention Centers: Does the
Current System Grant Human Rights to All Humans?, 17 PUB. INT. L. REP. 143 (2012); see also
Sayed, supra note 97, at 1849.
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hearings, legislative directives requiring annual research and data
collection, along with subtle policy changes.3 76  The efforts are laudable,
especially when compared to the complete inaction that has been the case
historically, but nonetheless fall short of effectively solving these
problems.3 7 7  Critics propose more radical solutions, such as targeting the
military structure-e.g., by removing the discretion of commanders-but
these ideas to date have not yet been implemented.3 78  While the insular
nature of these closed systems is relatively static and some reform of
existing policies and practices is necessary, changing entire institutional
structures is not realistic or viable for women in these systems suffering
abuse now, and thereby requires the creation of other kinds of solutions.3 7 9
A novel legal strategy within the closed systems is to utilize an
administrative cause of action to enforce regulatory standards.38 0 This
Article examines this in more depth in the context of the PREA and
detention centers, but it is a viable option to enforce standards within any
system.38 1 Solutions might also be found outside of these systems, and to
this end, a companion avenue for creating change may be to utilize the civil
law system.3 8 2  The PREA Commission acknowledges, "[e]ven the most
rigorous internal monitoring, however, is no substitute for opening up
correctional facilities to outside review."3 8 3 In particular, the class action
375. See generally U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY (Sept.
2013), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/09242013_StatutoryEnforcement ReportSexualAssaultin
the Military.pdf.
376. See BARBARA SALAZAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MILITARY SEXUAL ASSAULT:
CHRONOLOGY OF ACTIVITY IN CONGRESS AND RELATED RESOURCES 6-14 (2013) (providing an
overview of recent congressional activity involving sexual assault in the military); Christopher
Neiweem, Next Congress Must Act to Reduce Military Sexual Assault, HILL (Nov. 1, 2016),
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-military/303 847-next-congress-will-face-renewed-fight-to-
reduce-military.
377. See generally SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE U.S. MILITARY:
VOLUME 2. ESTIMATES FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SERVICE MEMBERS FROM THE 2014 RAND
MILITARY WORKPLACE STUDY (Andrew R. Morral, Kristie L. Gore, and Terry L. Schell, eds., 2016)
(noting the continuing prevalence of sexual assault and harassment in the military).
378. See generally Julie Dickerson, A Compensation System for Military Victims ofSexual Assault
and Harassment, 222 MIL. L. REV. 211 (2014).
379. Id. at 226-30.
380. See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, "Vacation" at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion
in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291 (2003).
381. See id.
382. See id.
383. PREA COMMISSION REPORT 2009, supra note 98, at 9.
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lawsuit is a valuable mechanism through which to accomplish the dual goals
of forcing change within the very structure and culture of these institutions
as well as compensating the victims for the harm they endured.3 8 4
The civil legal system in the United States provides options for those
who sustain harm as a result of intentional, negligent, or reckless behavior to
hold their perpetrators accountable in a noncriminal context.3 8 5 Civil
liability exists alongside or in lieu of criminal sanctions and is independent
in its burden of proof and evidentiary requirements.3 8 6 If the criminal system
is designed to punish wrongdoers, prevent future harm, and keep
communities safe, the civil system has, at its core, a commitment to restore
victims to the position they were in before they suffered harm and to
maintain notions of deterrence and fairness. 3 8 7  This restorative effect is
accomplished through compensation for things like medical expenses, lost
wages, pain and suffering, emotional harm, and the loss of enjoyment of
life.3 88 In addition to directing financial benefits to the victim, tort law also
provides the opportunity for injunctive relief or court-imposed directives
aimed at changing policies or behaviors.3 8 9 In these ways, civil liability
offers victims of sexual violence another avenue to find justice on an
individual and system-wide level.3 9 0 In the closed systems of the military
and detention facilities-systems that make internal justice seeking near
impossible-holding those accountable who perpetrate or allow the systemic
perpetration of sexual violence in a civil context is a critical option.3 9 1
Here, this Article explores the availability of civil lawsuits that can be
brought against institutions on behalf of victims of sexual violence. It does
not focus on individual liability that might be borne by specific perpetrators
384. See id. at 51-53.
385. See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS (2008).
386. Id.
387. Id. at 4; see also Brigett N. Shephard, Classifying Crime Victim Restitution: The Theoretical
Arguments and Practical Consequences of Labeling Restitution as Either a Criminal or Civil Law
Concept, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 801, 814 (2014) (stating that civil damages go beyond the
scope of criminal damages because "civil damages are much more likely to include punitive
damages, loss of consortium, and pain and suffering, concepts not traditionally included in
restitution").
388. See generally Lars Noah, Comfortably Numb: Medicalizing (and Mitigating) Pain-and-
Suffering Damages, 42 U. MICH. JL. REFORM 431 (2009).
389. See Dobbs, supra note 385, at 2; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 933 (1939).
390. See PREA COMMISSION REPORT 2009, supra note 98, at 10.
391. See id. at 52.
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largely because of the systemic focus of this work. A comprehensive
discussion of all generally available civil causes of action39 2 is beyond the
scope of this Article; however, it is a topic that other scholars have written
about extensively3 9 3 and deserves even further exploration to develop
solutions.3 9 4
This Article focuses on one particular civil legal tool-the class action
lawsuit-and its application to civil causes of action brought to find redress
for the perpetration of sexual violence.3 9 5 The class action lawsuit has long
been recognized as a powerful vehicle through which "mass justice" can be
accomplished, serving multiple important goals.3 9 6 Providing compensation
for harm and changing policy are two obvious ends, but even the threat of a
class action can have a powerful deterrent effect. 3 97
Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a class
action lawsuit must meet four preliminary requirements: numerosity, 3 98
commonality, 3 99 typicality, 40 0 and adequacy of representation. 401  A plaintiff
must prove these four preliminary requirements by a preponderance of the
evidence.4 0 2  According to the Supreme Court, class certification is only
proper when the district court finds that the four prerequisites have been
392. On the state level, there are many common law tort causes of actions that individual victims
of sexual violence may initiate against individuals or entities, including intentional torts like battery,
assault, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress; and in the case of systemic
abuse that occurs in an institutional setting, negligence. Many states have statutorily created special
causes of actions that are available for victims of sexual violence as civil rights provisions or state-
based versions of the now unavailable Violence Against Women Act.
393. See Ellen M. Bublick, Tort Suits Filed by Rape and Sexual Assault Victims in Civil Courts:
Lessons for Courts, Classrooms and Constituencies, 59 SMU L. REV. 55, 56 (2006); see generally
Leslie Bender, TortLaw'sRole as a Tool for Social Justice Struggle, 37 WASHBURNL.J. 249 (1998).
394. See, e.g., PREA COMMISSION REPORT 2009, supra note 98. "Despite this important
progress, much remains to be done." Id. at v.
395. Id.at5l-52.
396. Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline ofClass Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 830 (2013).
397. Id.
398. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). Numerosity requires that "the class is so numerous that joinder
of class members is impracticable." Id.
399. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2). The second requirement, commonality, dictates that "there are
questions of law or fact common to the class." Id.
400. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(3). Typicality requires that "the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class." Id.
401. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(4). Lastly, the final requirement states, "the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Id.
402. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 320 (3d Cir. 2008).
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satisfied "after a rigorous analysis."4 0 3  Lastly, the district court must find
that the lawsuit falls under the purview of Rule 23(b).404  The court's
decision to certify or to deny certification of a class is subject to review
based on a "limited" abuse of discretion standard, meaning that the
certification order must be premised on legal error to be overturned.405
Ultimately, courts are less deferential to the denial of certifications than they
are to the granting of them.4 0 6
There is strong legal precedent for the use of class actions in a variety of
contexts, and "[c]ivil rights and class actions have an historic
partnership."40 7 This partnership is one that is worth exploring and
ultimately expanding for victims of sexual violence in closed institutional
systems. "Indeed, some of the large cases [that] have drawn the most
criticism, like prisoners' rights suits, have reformed large, inefficient,
abusive, unconstitutional prison systems [that] remained unchanged for
decades or longer before courts ordered class relief." 408
Professor Robert Klonoff documents, however, that there has actually
been a decline in the success of class action lawsuits generally, in large part
due to a more stringent application and interpretation of Federal Rule 23
imposed by the courts. 409 The erosion of class action availability will have
serious consequences for individuals in closed institutional systems whose
access to justice is already seriously compromised. The trend toward
limiting class action availability is made even more difficult by additional
limitations imposed on civil lawsuits brought on behalf of those in prisons,
detention centers, and the military. This Article explores these limitations in
the following section in an effort to move toward a change in law and policy
403. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350-51 (2011) (quoting General Telephone
Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)).
404. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)-(3). In other words, the court must find that one of the following
elements is met: (1) that prosecution of separate actions risks either inconsistent adjudications that
would establish "incompatible standards of conduct" for the defendant or would, as a practical
matter, be "dispositive of the interests of the other[s]"; (2) that "defendants have acted or refused to
act on grounds that are applied generally to the class"; or (3) that there are common questions of law
or fact that predominate over any individual class member's questions and that a class action is
superior to other methods of adjudication. Id.
405. Patonv. N.M. Highlands Univ., 275 F.3d 1274, 1278 (10th Cir. 2002).
406. See In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 480 (2d Cir. 2008).
407. Jack Greenberg, Civil Rights Class Actions: Procedural Means of Obtaining Substance, 39
ARIZ L. REv. 575, 577 (1997).
408. Greenberg, supra note 407, at 576.
409. See Klonoff, supra note 396, at 830.
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so that the power of the class action lawsuit may be fully realized for this
particular group of victims.
From observing the victim-identified barriers to implementing lasting
change within closed institutional systems, this Article presents a dual
remedy to address sexual abuse.410 Both internal and external strategies are
needed: administrative suits to ensure the institutions are complying with
existing rules, as well as civil suits to compensate victims and effect system
change.
A. Civil Causes ofAction for Sexual Violence Victims in Detention
1. Limitations on Causes of Action in Institutions of Detention
a. Prisons
Victims of sexual violence can initiate several different civil causes of
action, often referred to as constitutional torts, on both the state and federal
level. 4 12 Prisoners can bring claims against prison officials under the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment-accomplished
on a state level by making a § 1983 claim under Title 42 of the United States
Code4 13 and on a federal level by bringing a Bivens claim.4 1 4
Due in large part to the public safety implications of running a prison,
there are stringent limitations on the types of actions inmates can bring to
challenge conditions of confinement.4 " Further, courts give great deference
to prison administrators to operate their facilities and control behavior of the
incarcerated population, 41 6 not unlike the deference afforded to the command
structure in the military. In 1996, the passage of the Prison Litigation
410. See supra Section II.A.1.
411. See infra Sections III.A-B.
412. See infra notes 413-14 and accompanying text.
413. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
414. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
415. See NATIONAL PREA RES. CTR., TRAINING CURRICULUM: HUMAN RESOURCES AND
ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS (Jan. 2014), http://www.prearesourcecenter.org/sites/default/
files/content/hr and admin invcurriculummodule_10_legal liability and admin investigations
0.pdf.
416. See Neal v. Dep't of Corr. (Neal 1), 583 N.W.2d 249, 252 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998)
(emphasizing the "wide-ranging deference" given to prisons).
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Reform Act placed significant limitations on prisoners in terms of how and
when they may bring civil actions regarding prison conditions and aspects of
confinement in federal court. 1 7 This new legislation made it more difficult
"for prisoners to bring, settle, and win lawsuits." 1  These limitations
encompass "all inmate suits [regarding] prison life, whether they involve
general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege
excessive force or some other wrong."4 19  Congress passed the PLRA as an
attempt to curb "frivolous" lawsuits by prisoners and prohibit those confined
in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility from bringing a claim "until
... [all] administrative remedies [that] are available are exhausted." 4 20 it
also requires that prospective relief be narrowly drawn and extend no further
than is necessary to correct the violation of a federal right of plaintiffs, but
places no limitation on private settlements.4 2 1  In practice, courts are
somewhat limited in their ability to impose systemic change for a violation,
such as injunctive relief; courts are to give "substantial weight to adverse
impacts on public safety or criminal justice operations"422 Until recently, an
inmate could not bring a claim of sexual abuse under the PLRA unless there
was a concrete showing of injury beyond the occurrence of the victimization
itself.423
417. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2) (2012). PLRA restrictions apply to "any civil proceeding arising
under Federal law with respect to the conditions of confinement or the effects of actions by
government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison . . . [excluding] habeas corpus
proceedings challenging the fact or duration of confinement in prison." Id.
418. Margo Schlanger, Prisoners' Rights Lawyers' Strategies for Preserving the Role of the
Courts, 69 U. MiA1viIL. REV. 519, 520 (2015).
419. JOHN BOSTON, LEGAL AID SOC'Y: PRISONERS' RIGHTS PROJECT, THE PRISON LITIGATION
REFORM ACT, 39 (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.wnylc.net/pb/docs/plra2cir04.pdf [hereinafter PLRA
REPORT].
420. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012).
421. See Schlanger, supra note 418, at 527-28.
422. PLRA REPORT, supra note 419, at 16. A court must take into account "the public safety
consequences of its order and to structure, and monitor, its ruling in a way that mitigates those
consequences while still achieving an effective remedy of the constitutional violation." Brown v.
Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 534 (2011). Although, the PLRA does allow "highly intrusive or burdensome
remedies where the record supports their necessity." See PLRA REPORT, supra note 419, at 26.
423. In 2013,
[t]he Violence Against Women Act [] largely resolved this [injury for sexual assault]
question by declaring that § 1997e(e) "is amended by inserting before the period at the
end the following: 'or the commission of a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of title
18, United States Code).' VAWA similarly amended 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), the PLRA
section imposing the physical injury requirement on the Federal Tort Claims Act for
persons convicted of a felony and awaiting sentencing or serving a sentence.
934
[Vol. 44: 881, 2017] Sexual Violence in Closed Institutional Systems
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
While inmates relinquish certain rights as a condition of their
confinement, this relinquishment is not absolute, and the Court recognizes
that prisons must not impinge upon certain inalienable rights.4 2 4 The
perpetration of sexual violence in prison is actionable under the Eighth
Amendment. 425 The Supreme Court considered the issue of perpetration of
sexual assault against prisoners in Farmer v. Brennan, and Justice
Blackmun, in a concurring opinion, wrote that prison officials have an
"affirmative duty under the Constitution to provide for the safety of inmates"
and that "[b]eing violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the
penalty." 4 26 Therefore, although subject to stringent limitations, prisoners do
have the ability to bring causes of action that address abuse.
Despite the clear message conveyed in Farmer that inmates should be
protected from sexual violence in prisons, certain aspects of the closed
system make this violence difficult to address: there is a power disparity that
cuts against the victims' credibility, there are rarely witnesses, victims are
disincentivized to report for fear of being labeled a snitch or because they
could face retaliation, and the cases are rarely prosecuted.4 2 7
However, prisoners historically found some success in enacting changes
in prison policy through constitutional tort actions.4 2 8  In a class action
lawsuit against the District of Columbia, the court stated that, "[r]ape,
coerced sodomy, unsolicited touching of women prisoners' vaginas, breasts
and buttocks by prison employees are 'simply not part of the penalty that
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society."' 429  Specifically,
John Boston, Congress Amends PLRA Physical Injury Requirement for Sexual Abuse Cases, PRISON
LEGAL NEWS (July 15, 2013), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2013/jul/1 5/congress-amends-
pira-physical-injury-requirement-for-sexual-abuse-cases/ (citing Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-12, 127 Stat. 54, § 1101 (2013) (Sexual Abuse in
Custodial Settings)).
424. See infra note 462 and accompanying text.
425. See Amy Laderburg, The "Dirty Little Secret": Why Class Actions Have Emerged as the
Only Viable Option for Women Inmates Attempting to Satisfy the Subjective Prong of the Eighth
Amendment in Suits for Custodial Sexual Abuse, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 323, 326 (1998)
(discussing why class actions under the Eighth Amendment are the best option for inmate victims of
sexual violence).
426. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
427. See Laderburg, supra note 425, at 323-24, 324 n.4.
428. Id.
429. Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep't of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634, 641
(D.D.C. 1994), vacated in part, modified in part, 899 F. Supp. 659 (D.D.C. 1995) (quoting Farmer,
511 U.S. at 834).
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class action litigation utilizing a constitutional tort cause of action has
become an effective way to effect system change and compensate victims. 43 0
Class action suits have certain features that contribute to success in
achieving relief for those sexually abused while incarcerated, including
increased media attention and exposure; enhancing an inmate's credibility,
bolstering the claim that the abuses occurred in a "sexualized environment"
instead of simply happening on an individualized basis, and potentially
leading to a greater perception of harm by the courts and public.4 3 1
Much of the scholarly discussion of constitutional torts focuses on
Eighth Amendment actions presenting an "insurmountable challenge" facing
the inmate-plaintiff, due in large part to the harshness of the standards of
review in the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment analysis. 43 2  Yet, in
combining claims into a class action, plaintiff-inmates have found some
success in impacting system-level change.4 3 3  While Eighth Amendment
actions against a guard in his individual capacity have had some success,
they are somewhat limited in their capacity to change patterns of abuse or
the greater system. 43 4 An infrequently discussed option in the literature is
the initiation of a civil rights cause of action (§ 1983) to address sexual
violence in prison.4 3 5 Civil rights causes of action may be commenced at the
state or federal level and may face their own challenges, but they have
emerged as an avenue for promoting settlements that both effect system
change and result in monetary settlement and compensation. 436 Therefore, it
is a particularly valuable tool for survivors of assault in incarceration
settings because the large number of victims bolsters legal argument and
provides a better capacity for system-wide injunctive relief.437
430. See infra note 437 and accompanying text.
431. Laderburg, supra note 425, at 327-28.
432. See id. at 328; John Boston et al., Farmer v. Brennan: Defining Deliberate Indifference
Under the Eighth Amendment, 14 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 83, 99 (1994).
433. See Laderburg, supra note 425, at 323.
434. See id. at 326 n.12 ("A prisoner's suit against a guard in his individual capacity for a
violation of her Eighth Amendment rights may arise from the plaintiffs' allegations that the guard
raped or otherwise sexually abused her."). See, e.g., Women Prisoners ofD.C. Dep't of Corr., 877
F. Supp. 634, 640; Carrigan v. Delaware, 957 F. Supp. 1376, 1390 (D. Del. 1997); Fisher v. Goord,
981 F. Supp. 140, 174-75 (W.D.N.Y. 1997).
435. See infra notes 436-37.
436. See Neal v. Dep't of Corr. (Neal l), 583 N.W.2d 249 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
437. See Laderburg, supra note 425, at 323. Laderburg argues that Eighth Amendment class
actions are the best option for prisoners wishing to obtain injunctive relief from custodial abuse in
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b. Immigration Detention Facilities
While civil immigration detention centers improperly replicate practices
of prisons and jails in addressing sexual victimization, federal law has been
relatively silent regarding forms of relief available to individuals held in
detention. 43 8 The need for civil remedies in this context is a pressing and
timely issue. In 2010, numerous reports of sexual abuse at the hands of a
guard emerged from the Hutto Detention Center in Texas. 43 9 These reports
are particularly chilling, because this was the detention center identified by
President Obama in 2009 as the "model for the detention reform plan" and
thus "an example of the enhanced oversight ICE planned." 440 This system
purported to "make better use of sound practices ... that comply with the
Prisoner Rape Elimination Act," and yet this was clearly insufficient to halt
abuse.441
Before exploring remedies available to those detained in immigration
detention facilities, it should be noted that immigration centers house
individuals for a variety of reasons for differing amounts of time.44 2  The
detention systems are largely operated directly by ICE, but there are contract
detention facilities run by private companies, and facilities run by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, and state and county jails. 443  "Approximately
seventy percent of detainees are held in jails under ad hoc agreements, up
from approximately twenty-five percent fifteen years ago."4 4 4 Legal action
to challenge their detention may include a Joseph hearing to challenge their
detention, or a removal hearing to challenge their removability.
American prisons. This Article does not necessarily argue that Eighth Amendment class actions are
the best option, but acknowledges that many of the same strengths Laderburg identifies in the Eighth
Amendment class action exist in the civil rights action of Neal. See Laderburg, supra note 425, at
323.
438. See infra Section III.A.I.b.
439. See Detained and at Risk, supra note 13.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id.; see also Detained and Dismissed: Women's Struggles to Obtain Health Care in United
States Immigration Detention, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 17, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/
reports/2009/03/16/detained-and-dismissed-0.
444. Kalhan, supra note 100, at 46.
445. Sayad, supra note 97, at 1849; see generally Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA
1999). Notably, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in removal proceedings; the
Immigration Judges (IJs) "have broad discretion to admit and consider relevant and probative
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For abuses that occur in detention centers, detainees do not have the
same constitutional rights as citizens of the United States. 4 46  Because the
detention center is considered a form of civil punishment, the Eighth
Amendment does not provide an avenue for relief,4 4 7 but the Court has
recognized that detainees have some due process rights and that they should
not be subjected to government conduct that "shocks the conscience or
interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."4 4' To this
end, detainees have the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free
from torture, 4 4  rights to be free from inhumane and punitive conditions of
confinement,o and certain privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment.
Sexual victimization that occurs in immigration detention facilities may
meet the definition of torture in the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, violate the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), or both-two
treaties which the United States has ratified.4 52 Some of the federal criminal
evidence." Id. An ICE district director makes the initial determination of whether a detainee is
mandatorily detainable. Id. The detainee may argue that he is not properly included in the
mandatory detention provision. Id. If the detainee meets the burden in immigration court, there will
be a bond hearing to determine if the detainee poses a flight risk; but even if he wins, there may be
an automatic stay of the decision; and if the detainee loses, he will remain in detention. Id.
Immigration judges are precluded from independently reviewing ICE's parole and custody
determinations; and ICE has a large amount of discretion. Id. at 46.
446. See Budhrani, supra note 201, at 788 ("[A] series of Supreme Court cases emerged
challenging the authority of the federal government both to detain noncitizens for extended periods
of time and to hold them in conditions that did not conform with established standards.").
447. See STOP PRISONER RAPE, supra note 18.
448. Holland v. Carballo, 322 F.3d 386, 410-11 (6th Cir. 2003).
449. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386,
410-11 (6th Cir. 2003).
450. See Oladipupo v. Austin, 104 F. Supp. 2d 654 (W.D. La. 2000); Taylor, supra note 108, at
1090; Budhrani, supra note 201, at 788-89 (2012).
451. See Detained and at Risk, supra note 13, at 6-7 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment's privacy
protections are relevant to practices that may facilitate the sexual harassment of individuals in
custody. Federal courts have held that those privacy protections prohibit male guards from strip-
searching female prisoners, conducting intrusive pat-frisks, or engaging in inappropriate visual
surveillance.").
452. See STOP PRISONER RAPE, supra note 18, at 3; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465
U.N.T.S. 113, 113-14 ("[T]he term 'torture' means any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
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penalties for sexual assault of prisoners apply to detainees. 45 3  The Alien
Tort Statute governs civil remedies for immigration detainees and permits
litigation for human rights violations.5
As discussed previously, the PREA applies to immigration centers and
establishes zero-tolerance policies and suggestions to lessen sexual assault
by improved reporting in these centers-similarly to prisons.45  However,
these PREA guidelines do not apply to privately run immigration centers.4 5 6
"Despite President Obama's statement that PREA regulations would apply
to all federal correctional facilities, including immigration detention centers,
PREA standards do not apply to CDFs; for private facilities, DHS intends to
implement PREA standards by phasing them in through contract
modifications, contract renewals, and creation of new contracts."4 5 7  It is
unclear whether a detainee in an immigration detention center can use the
PREA as a legal strategy. 5  Some scholars argue there is no cause of action
available to target an agency's failure to comply with PREA standards but
that victims may have a remedy in arguing that noncompliance violates
facilities constitutional obligations.4 5' However, if a plaintiff utilizes that
constitutional argument, some case law supports that certain institutions do
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to
lawful sanction."); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 10, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 176 [hereinafter ICCPR].
453. See Detained and at Risk, supra note 13; 18 U.S.C. § 2243(b) (2012).
454. The Alien Tort Statute (ATS), adopted by Congress in 1789 as part of the first Judiciary Act
and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350, reads: "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); Budhrani, supra note 201, at 800 (2012). Some issues
identified with bringing a claim under the ATS include a lack of cause of action stemming directly
from human rights treaties, and sovereign immunity. For a fuller discussion, see Budhrani, supra
note 201, at 800-05.
455. See 42 U.S.C. § 15607(c) (2012) (making PREA guidelines applicable to detention facilities
operated by the Department of Homeland Security); PREA COMMIssioN REPORT 2009, supra note
98, at 5; see also US: Protect Against Rape in Immigration Detention: Indictment Alleging Sexual
Abuse in Texas Facility Is Latest Case, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 24, 2011), https://www.hrw.org
/news/2011/06/24/us-protect-against-rape-immigration-detention (discussing the need to protect
immigration detainees from rape under the same guidelines proposed for prison facilities).
456. See Mufioz, supra note 4, at 570.
457. Id. (citing Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Sexual Abuse and Assault in
Confinement Facilities, 79 Fed. Reg. 13100, 13127 (Mar. 7, 2014) (codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 115).
458. See Munoz, supra note 4, at 588-89.
459. See id. (citing ACLU, END THE ABUSE, PROTECTING LGBTI PRISONERS FROM SEXUAL
ASSAULT (2014), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/prea/012014-ACLU-PREA-Guide.pdf).
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not take these types of suits seriously enough to deter sexual abuse or make
change. 46 0  To respond to this issue, one scholar recommends that there
should be a cause of action for victims of sexual abuse when a correctional
facility fails to implement or comply with PREA standards. 461  This Article
argues that there may be potential worth exploring in bringing an
administrative action to enforce compliance with PREA standards in
immigration detention facilities due to some progress made in the prison
context. 46 2  This does not, however, underscore the necessity of civil
litigation to both inspire change and provide compensation to victims.
2. Available Avenues for Justice in Prison: The Class Action Lawsuit
vis-a-vis Neal v. Michigan Department of Corrections
The relative success of the class action lawsuit Neal v. MDOC illustrates
463
the necessity of preserving access to civil justice in the realm of detention.
Though imperfect, Neal accomplished important ends: it provided monetary
compensation for victims, resulted in widespread changes in prison policies,
created a deterrent effect, placed other states on notice that sexual
victimization perpetrated by staff against inmates will not be tolerated, and
generated substantial public awareness of the problem through media
464
coverage.
Michigan prisons have long been exposed as fostering and turning a
blind eye to widespread sexual abuses by correctional staff against female
460. Mufioz, supra note 4, at 588-89.
While it has been suggested that victims may have a remedy in arguing that
noncompliance violates the facilities constitutional obligation, case law shows that even
with this looming threat, facilities have been deliberately indifferent to harm resulting
from a lack of compliance with PREA standards; in many cases, no reasonable action
takes place upon filing a complaint to stop and prevent the sexual abuse.
Id. at 588-90.
461. See id. at pt.E.
462. See, e.g., Proposed Decision, Brown v. Patuxent Inst., OAH No. DPSC-IGO-002V-14-33232
(2015), https://freestatelegal.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Brown-2015.08.17-Decision-of-Secret
ary-and-ALJ.pdf.
463. See Neal v. Dep't of Corr. (Neal l), 583 N.W.2d 249 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
subsection 302(a) of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in facilities such as the MDOC's
correctional facilities, which are "places of 'public service"' within the meaning of the Act).
464. See, e.g., Norman Sinclair et al., Sexual Abuse Behind Bars: Detroit News Special Report,
DETROIT NEWS, May 22-25, 2005.
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inmates dating back to the 1980S.465 Multiple reports, interviews, articles,
and lawsuits attempted to address the abuses. 46 6  For example, in United
States v. Michigan, the Attorney General alleged that Michigan prisons were
subjecting prisoners to unconstitutional conditions, including sexual abuse;
the resulting settlement led to a two-year period of oversight aimed at
curbing the abuse.46 7 However, once the oversight ended, the closed system
faced no external pressure to continue its reform efforts, and incarcerated
women subsequently continued to report widespread abuses and
retaliation. 46 8 The PREA guidelines and changes were introduced in 2003469
and implemented from 2009 to 2012,470 yet prisons saw no real change.
Civil rights attorney Deborah Labelle initiated the groundbreaking class
action lawsuit on behalf of 809 incarcerated women who were sexually
472
abused over two decades by correctional staff in the state of Michigan.
Plaintiffs filed a civil rights action under Michigan's Elliott Larsen Civil
Rights Act (ELCRA), which prohibits discrimination, including sexual
harassment, in public accommodations or public services-i.e., public
facilities owned, operated, or managed by the state.4 7 3 Plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants were aware of widespread and systemic sexual abuse of
female inmates by male prison guards and failed to take action to stop the
abuse. 7  The alleged abuses ranged from rape, sexual harassment, forced
abortions, privacy violations, cross-gender pat-downs, forced public nudity,
and retaliation for reporting.
Over a period of almost fifteen years, the litigation faced many
465. See United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1991).
466. See NOWHERE TO HIDE, supra note 187; Michigan, 940 F.2d at 143.
467. Michigan, 940 F.2d at 145-46; see also Complaint at 5-6, Michigan, 940 F.2d 143 (No. 84-
63), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-MI-0007-000I.pdf.
468. See NOWHERE TO HIDE, supra note 187 (noting that several retaliation cases occurred after
Michigan, 940 F.2d 143).
469. See Prison Rape Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15601 (2003).
470. See PREA COMMISSION REPORT 2009, supra note 98, at 29.
471. Juan A. Lozano, Most States Failing to Meet Anti-Prison Rape Rules, DETROIT NEWS (Sept.
11, 2016), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/nation/2016/09/1 1/prison-rape-rules/90237006/.
472. See Culley, supra note 36, at 207.
473. See Second Amended Complaint, Neal v. Mich. Dep't of Corr. (Neal 1), 583 N.W.2d 249
(Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (No. 96-6986); Culley, supra note 36, at 211-12; MICH. COMP. LAWS §
37.2303 (1992); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 37.2301 (1999).
474. See NealI, 583 N.W.2d at 206.
475. Id.; Culley, supra note 36, at 210.
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challenges; defendants argued the ELCRA did not apply because
correctional facilities were not places of public service-an issue the
Michigan legislature amended to clarify mid-litigation, concluding that
correctional facilities were not places of public service. 4 76  However, the
hard work of the attorneys in Neal paid off when the Michigan Court of
Appeals eventually held that the amendment did not apply retroactively and
cleared the way for the case to proceed to trial. 7  At the end of the trial, the
jury returned a verdict for the female inmates and awarded them more than
$15 million. In an unprecedented move, the trial jury also read an apology
to the women for the abuses they had suffered at the hands of the
correctional staff.479 During the litigation, in 2000, men were taken off the
housing units of the prison.40 An appeal by the state was harshly denied by
the Michigan Court of Appeals, with the court indicating it was appalled by
the officers who "targeted like a radar women with histories of sexual or
physical abuse, or prisoners in emotional vulnerable positions.
Ultimately, the case settled in 2009 for $100 million and numerous remedial
measures were subsequently implemented to address and prevent the future
sexual abuse of women in Michigan prisons.4 8 2
Without access to this civil remedy, the closed system would not have
been pressured to change its policies and practices and sexual abuse would
still be a serious problem. 48 3 This remedy is by no means perfect, and it did
not eliminate the perpetration of sexual abuse; however, it has significantly
changed this closed system in positive ways. 48 4  In 2016, other prisons
followed suit in attempting to utilize the class action lawsuit, arguing that
even despite prisons' zero-tolerance policy pursuant to the PREA, "a culture
476. See generally Culley, supra note 36.
477. Id. at 210.
478. See id.
479. See id.
480. See Michael Rigby, Ban on Male Guards in Michigan Women's Prisons Upheld, PRISON
LEGAL NEWS (Sept. 15, 2005), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2005/sep/15/ban-on-male-
guards-in-michigan-womens-prisons-upheld/.
481. Culley, supra note 36, at 213 (citing Neal v. Mich. Dep't of Corr. (Neal l), 583 N.W.2d 249
(Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
482. See Class Settlement Agreement, Neal I, 583 N.W.2d 249 (No. 96-6986),
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-MI-0021-0003.pdf.
483. See infra notes 484-94 and accompanying text.
484. See Culley, supra note 36, at 223-24.
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has been created that is 'functionally indifferent' to the risk of abuse."
Scholars have argued that class actions emerged as an essential option for
inmate victims of sexual assault,486 and Neal exhibits how the ability of these
inmates to combine their voices into a class action lawsuit yielded
significant results in bringing attention to the previously unrecognized issue
of sexual assault in prison, compensating the victims, and enacting change in
the prison system.48 7 This Article attempts to break down the silos among
closed systems and learn from the successes and failures of each toward the
end of serving the interests of survivors of sexual violence.
To date, a successful class action comparable to Neal has not been
brought in the context of immigration detention facilities. However, sexual
violence in these facilities is widespread and shares many similarities in
nature, such as the barriers to reporting and investigation that exist in prisons
and the military.48" Because the immigration detention facilities are a hybrid
closed system-civil detention centers where occupants have slightly more
rights than prisoners but fewer than those in the community-they are
strongly positioned to be sued vis-a-vis the Neal model.48 9
Advocates for victims of abuse in immigration detention facilities are
beginning to take action to force change and seek compensation on their
behalf, but have so far experienced only limited success. 49 0 "In 2007, the
ACLU sued the federal government due to the facility's harsh conditions,
which resulted in the release of dozens of families."4 9 1 For remedies to
sexual abuse, a Fifth Amendment claim was brought against federal officers
individually, arguing they had violated plaintiffs' due process right to
freedom of deliberate indifference to a risk of harm.49 2 The Fifth Circuit,
485. Weiser, supra note 127; see generally Class Action Complaint, Jones 1 v. Annucci, slip op.
05275 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.legal-aid.org/media/201965/02.26.16_complaint.pdf.
486. See generally Laderburg, supra note 425.
487. See generally Neal v. Mich. Dep't of Corr. (Neal l), 583 N.W.2d 249 (1998).
488. See JUST DETENTION INT'L, SEXUAL ABUSE IN THE U.S. IMMIGRATION DETENTION (Jan.
2009), http://justdetention.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FS-Sexual-Abuse-in-U.S.-Immigration-
Detention.pdf.
489. Gretchen Gavett, What Are Immigration Detainees' Legal Rights?, PBS (Oct. 18, 2011),
http://pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/what-are-immigration-detainees-legal-rights/.
490. Mufioz, supra note 4, at 578-79.
491. Id.
492. See id.
The several sexually abused plaintiffs brought action against federal officers, George
Robertson and Jose Rosado, alleging they had violated their Fifth Amendment rights.
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ruled:
[N]o clearly established law provides that an official's knowledge
of contractual breaches and of the breached provision's aim to
prevent sexual assault of detainees, standing alone, amounts to
deliberate indifference in violation of a detainee's Fifth Amendment
rights, because no controlling authority provides that such breaches
are "facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists."493
It was determined that both officers were entitled to qualified immunity.4 9 4
3. Additional Avenue for Justice? The Prison Rape Elimination Act as
a Basis for Administrative Causes of Action
Some scholars have discussed the relative successes and failures of the
PREA in litigation contexts.4 9 5 Unfortunately, because the PREA does not
create a private cause of action for an agency's failure to comply with its
standards, a rape victim may not file a suit against the agency solely for
noncompliance.4 9 6  It has been argued that victims may be successful in
arguing that noncompliance with the PREA results in violations of
constitutional obligations borne by the facility, but in practice, most courts
do not get to the PREA argument if detainees or prisoners raise it.49 7 In
cases where the courts do consider plaintiffs' arguments regarding the
The immigrant plaintiffs alleged the facility's logbooks and reports demonstrated the
officer's indifference to transportation regulation. The documents demonstrated the
transportation of female detainees by male officers, without the presence of female
officers. The documents indicated seventy-seven incidents.
Id.
493. Id.
494. See id. at 579.
495. See Gabriel Arkles, Prison Rape Elimination Act Litigation and the Perpetuation of Sexual
Harm, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 801, 811 (2014).
496. See Mufioz, supra note 4, at 568 (citing Alex Friedmann, Prison Rape Elimination Act
Standards Finally in Effect, but Will They Be Effective?, PRISON LEGAL NEWS 3 (Sept. 2013),
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/issues/09plnl 3.pdf).
497. Arkles, supra note 495, at 811. "In most cases where prisoners raise violations of PREA in
their complaints, courts decline to consider PREA at all because of the lack of a private right of
action." Id.
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PREA, they remain unswayed.4 9 8
In the context of immigration detention, one legal advocacy group
attempted to utilize the PREA as the basis for a cause of action.4 9 9 In 2014,
"the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF)
filed a complaint with the Homeland Security Department after several
women detained at the facility alleged staff members there sexually
assaulted them. The complaint stated that the ongoing sexual abuse
allegations were in violation of PREA."oo They further alleged that the
incidents of abuse and sexual harassment subjected the detained individuals
to "conditions that are punitive and unconstitutional under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment." 0 1 As a remedy, the complaint requested
that federal officials "investigate the allegations and implement the
necessary protective measures to ensure compliance with PREA."5 0 2 The
abuses described in the complaint mirror those cited in Neal, specifically
when the Karnes Center guards removed female detainees from their cells
late in the evening for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts in various parts
of the facility.5 0 3 Additionally, they called detainees their "novias" or
"girlfriends" and used their power and authoritative positions as a way to
manipulate the vulnerable detainees "by requesting sexual favors." 0 4 In
return, the guards made promises of financial reward, committed to help the
women with their immigration cases, and made promises to provide housing
for them following their release from detention.05
Much like the prisons' responses in Neal, by September 2014, the
facility had not taken action to attempt to stop or prevent any future abuse
498. See id. In Jenkins v. Hennepin, the plaintiff alleged that defendant officials were deliberately
indifferent to create or implement policy with regard to sexual abuse and knew about the need for
such a policy because of the PREA. Id. (citing Jenkins v. Cty. of Hennepin, Minn., No. CIV.06-
3625(RHK/AJB), 2009 WL 3202376, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2009)). The court held that even
though the defendants did have some knowledge of the PREA, the plaintiff did not offer sufficient
evidence that the defendants consciously understood the risk of rape and deliberately chose not to
implement such a policy. Id. at 813 (citing Jenkins, 2009 WL 3202376, at *2).
499. See Mufioz, supra note 4, at 581.
500. Id.
501. See Letter from Marisa Bono, Staff Attorney to Mexican Am. Legal Def. & Educ. Fund to
The Honorable Jeh Johnson, Sec'y of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 30, 2014) (on file at
http://www.maldef.org/assets/pdf/2014-09-30_KarnesPREALetter Complaint.pdf).
502. Id. at 582.
503. Munoz, supra note 4, at 581-82.
504. Id. at 583.
505. Id.
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despite MALDEF's complaint.5 0 6 In fact, they did the opposite, providing
the guards with an environment that facilitated sexual abuse, where male
guards had free access to the cells where women and children resided any
time during the day and night. 5 7
One scholar notes that the current structure of the immigration detention
center system facilitates abuse and demands intervention, 08 and others
suggest that the facilities require external oversight.5 09 Thus, the class action
may be a particularly effective method to facilitate the external oversight and
effect change. However, even with this oversight, an internal remedy to
enforce the rules facilities claim they comply with has equally essential
value. 10 Scholars argue that there are ways to make the PREA more
effective in litigation, but based on recent successes in the prison context,
there may also be a remedy in administrative law.1
Despite the successes of Neal, it was a hard-won fight that spanned over
506. See Marisa Bono, MALDEF Staff Attorney, PREA and Complaints ofSexual Abuse at ICE
Karnes Facility, U.S. CoMvi'N ON CIV. RTS. 1, 4 (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.usccr.gov/OIG/
MarisaBonoWrittenStatement FINAL.pdf.
To date, Complainants have received two formal responses from federal agencies.
Complainants received an October 29, 2014 letter from ICE indicating that the complaint
had been received, and that an investigation was ongoing. Complainants called the
contact provided in the letter, but did not receive a return phone call. Complainants also
received a December 4, 2014 letter from DHS Civil Rights and Civil Liberties confirming
that the complaint had been received and that an investigation was ongoing. The Office
of the Inspector General (OIG) investigator also contacted Complainants in October of
2014, informing Complainants that OIG was conducting an investigation. Despite
repeated requests, Complainants have no additional information regarding the details of
the investigations.
Id.
507. Mufioz, supra note 4, at 578-79.
The conditions stated in the complaint, violated the zero-tolerance policy established by
PREA. PREA specifically states that sexual abuse is any incident when a staff member is
involved in sexual contact with a detainee or resident. It is considered sexual abuse
regardless of whether or not the sexual intercourse is consensual. Sexual abuse also
includes any attempt, threat, or request by a facility staff member with the purpose of
engaging in sexual intercourse.
Id.
508. See Maunica Sthanki, Deconstructing Detention: Structural Impunity and the Need for an
Intervention, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 447 (2013) ("This Article argues that the U.S. immigration
detention system, the largest law enforcement operation in the country, operates with structural
impunity resulting in the perpetual abuse of the detained population.").
509. Id. at 497.
510. See id. at 470. This type of action would likely be covered by "traditional state tort law." Id.
511. See generally Arkles, supra note 495.
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fifteen years, and largely occurred before the PREA had been fully
implemented.5 12 Thus, learning from the context of immigration detention
facilities, a PREA-related cause of action in the prison context may
supplement the role of class actions. In April 2015, lawyers utilizing an
administrative remedy under the PREA to remedy sexual violence found
some success in the prison context.513 In Neon Brown v. Patuxent Institution
in Maryland, a transgender inmate alleged the facility failed to train its
employees on how to comply with PREA regulations, which led to a hostile
environment in which she was subjected to sexual harassment and abuse.
The administrative law judge found that this abuse violated specific PREA
standards the state facility. 1 5  The remedy recommended by the ALJ was
that the facility promulgate policies and institute mandatory training
regarding transgender inmates that comply the with PREA, as well as pay
$5000 in damages and award 20 diminution credits in recognition of the 50
days the inmate was held in administrative segregation beyond what was
appropriate.5 16 The success in this administrative law context may be a
model for other members of closed systems who face abuse related to a
failure to implement changes to meet compliance with federal regulatory
schemes like the PREA.
B. Civil Liability for Military Victims ofSexual Violence
This Article is not the first to suggest sweeping reforms in the military
to better serve victims of sexual assault. There are those that argue that
the closed-system governance of these issues-which falls entirely within
512. See Culley, supra note 36.
513. Proposed Decision, Brown v. Patuxent Institution, OAH No. DPSC-IGO-002V-14-33232
(Aug. 17, 2015), https://freestatelegal.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Brown-2015.08.17-Decision-
of-Secretary-and-ALJ.pdf.
514. Id. at 13.
515. Id. at 26. The Administrative Law Judge found that the facility's actions violated the PREA
because correctional staff violated her privacy while she was in the shower, verbally harassed her-
including telling her she should kill herself-and placed her in administrative segregation for an
extended stay-the entire sixty-six days she was confined at the facility. Id.
516. Id. at 33-34.
517. See, e.g., Schenck, supra note 68, at 582; see generally Ann M. Vallandingham, Department
of Defense 's Sexual Assault Policy: Recommendations for a More Comprehensive and Uniform
Policy, 54 NAVAL L. REV. 205 (2007) (advocating policy changes regarding better definitions for
restricted reporting and expanding the class of victims to which restricted reporting is made
available).
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the military, has nearly no external check, and often leaves victims without
remedy-should be overhauled."' However, some argue that these critics
fail to understand the unique military context, including the "crucial role of
convening authorities in the maintenance of good order and discipline, the
allocation of resources in the prosecution of cases, and the important
prosecutorial element that military cases have legitimacy with military
juries, which includes the chain of command's support."5 1 9 This Article
explores the existing limitations on military causes of action both
conceptually and through the lens of the failed class action, Klay v. Panetta;
ultimately urging a middle-ground reform of constitutional jurisprudence
toward an end of allowing redress for victims of sexual violence.
1. Limitations on Civil Military Causes of Action
Although victims of sexual assault in the broader community may take
advantage of a range of civil causes of action, victims in the military face a
complex web of limitations imposed by internal policies, federal statutes,
and Supreme Court jurisprudence, effectively making access to civil justice
difficult if not impossible.5 2 0
Historically, common law precluded the U.S. Government from bearing
liability for the negligent actions of military members.5 21  The Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) changed the common law doctrine and waived
governmental immunity in certain situations, allowing individuals the right
to sue for negligent acts committed within a government employee's scope
of employment.5 2 2  In passing the FTCA, Congress desired to provide a
518. See Ruth Rosen, The Invisible War Against Rape in the U.S. Military, HIST. NEWS NETWORK
(Mar. 24, 2014), http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/155049; Helene Cooper, Senate Rejects
Blocking Military Commanders from Sexual Assault Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/us/politics/military-sexual-assault-legislation.html?_r-0.
Senator "Gillibrand's legislation would have taken the prosecution of sexual assault cases out of the
military chain of command and given it to the independent Judge Advocates General Corps."
Rosen, supra.
519. Schenck, supra note 68, at 582.
520. See infra notes 521-41 and accompanying text.
521. See Michael Rust, Expansion of the Feres Doctrine, 32 EMORY L.J. 237, 238 (1983).
Although, at one point, courts did allow such causes of action when "superior officers act[ed]
maliciously or outside the scope of their authority." Ann-Marie Woods, A "More Searching Judicial
Inquiry": The Justiciability ofIntra-Military Sexual Assault Claims, 55 B.C. L. REv. 1329, 1333-34
(2014).
522. See Rust, supra note 521, at 238-39.
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remedy for individuals harmed at the hands of the government.5 23 However,
federal law provides exceptions, including one that disallows claims derived
from "combatant activities" within the military or that might arise during
524
wartime. The exact meaning of this exception has been the subject of
significant controversy, but congressional history lends support to the idea
that it was intended only as a narrow exception.5 25
Brooks v. United States was the first Supreme Court case to interpret the
FTCA; the Court's decision suggests that this exception should be narrowly
interpreted and does not exclude all military personnel tort claims. 5 26 The
Court's opinion made it clear that negligence claims brought in contexts that
are not "incident to service" may proceed against the government.5 2 7 Brooks
involved a vehicular accident occurring off of military base; the Court
stated, "[w]ere the accident to the Brooks' service, a wholly different case
would be presented."5 28 The meaning of "incident to service," however, is
the subject of significant debate.5 2 9
Definition of this elusive phrase occurred just one year later in United
States v. Feres, where the Court drew a critical distinction between the
specific facts of two cases; Feres involved a service member's death as a
result of a fire while he was on active duty, and Brooks involved a car
accident committed outside of a military base.5 3 0 The Court's decision
rested on whether an act occurred "incident to service," yet it still did not
clearly define what the phrase actually meant; the language, which has
subsequently taken on a life of its own as a guiding determinant for tort
liability against the military, is also glaringly absent from the FTCA.5 3 1
Feres expanded governmental immunity in the limited military context.5 32
As a result, "[s]overeign immunity trumps individual liability under the
Feres doctrine, even in the face of clear injustices suffered by military
523. Id. at 238-39.
524. 28 U.S.C. § 2680() (2016).
525. See Woods, supra note 521, at 1335-36.
526. Id. at 1337.
527. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949).
528. Id.
529. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 155 (1950) ("There are few guiding materials for
our task of statutory construction.").
530. Id. at 137; see also Brooks, 337 U.S. at 53.
531. Woods, supra note 521, at 1338.
532. Feres, 340 U.S. at 135.
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service members."5 3 3
In particular, the doctrine has become synonymous with three core
principles: (1) respect for and deference to decisions made in the
context of intra-military supervision, under the "incident to service"
exception to the FTCA; (2) the existence of an alternative
compensation scheme and system of justice that is more than
sufficient and capable of providing service members with an
alternative to tort recovery; and (3) the concern regarding
undercutting, and thereby destabilizing, the military discipline
structure if soldiers are permitted to hold their superior officers and
other government officials liable in Article III courts.5 34
Courts routinely rely on these principles in their decisions involving the
Feres doctrine.5 3 5
While the Feres doctrine was originally meant to prohibit FTCA
claims against the military as an institution, its reasoning was later
used to justify prohibiting military service members from bringing
Bivens actions against individual military officials for violating
service members' constitutional rights as well, under the "special
factors counseling hesitation" prong of the two-part Bivens inquiry.
This has created even greater immunity for the military than was
originally intended by the Supreme Court in Feres.5 3 6
Despite compelling arguments to limit government immunity in the
military context, there exists a contingent of judges and scholars who argue
the Feres doctrine should be revisited and refined.5 3 7  Four dissenting
Supreme Court opinions authored by Justices Scalia, Thomas, O'Connor,
and Brennan argue against the current interpretation.538 "Coupled with
533. Woods, supra note 521, at 1332.
534. Id. at 1341.
535. See, e.g., Ortiz v. U.S. ex rel. Evans Army Cmty. Hosp., 786 F.3d 817 (10th Cir. 2015).
536. Aparna Krishnaswamy Patrie, No Place in the Military: The Judiciary's Failure to
Compensate Victims ofMilitary Sexual Assault and a Suggested Path Forward Using Lessons from
the Prison Context, 8 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 119, 124 (2015) (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971)).
537. See Woods, supra note 521, at 1345.
538. See Lanus v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2731, 2732 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting); United
States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 704-06 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Stanley,
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disapproval in the lower courts, these judicial critiques of the Feres doctrine
suggest that it is not a matter of if, but when the Court will reexamine the
decision."53 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in a recent decision
dismissing a medical malpractice claim against a military hospital opined,
"[s]uffice it to say that when a court is forced to apply the Feres doctrine, it
frequently does so with a degree of regret." 40  The Court may in fact have
an opportunity to revisit Feres if it chooses to take up the appeal in the Ortiz
case.
54 1
Based on this Article's observation of the difficulty in attempting to
enact change in the closed system of prison without external pressure from
the courts, the doctrine demands revision-either through shifts in judicial
decision-making or congressional action to amend the FTCA.
2. Klay v. Panetta and Its Progeny: The Failure of Class Action
Lawsuits Against the Military for Sexual Violence
As this Article extensively discusses, sexual victimization in the military
occurs at exceedingly high rates and affects numerous women.54 2 Because
of the closed institutional military system, victims encounter major barriers
to reporting, find investigatory practices to be unsatisfactory, and more often
483 U.S. 669, 709-10 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681,
700 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
539. Woods, supra note 521, at 1343. Other scholars disagree and argue that overturning the
Feres doctrine is not a realistic option because it would also require overhaul of the FTCA and the
Military Claims Act (MCA). For example, one scholar argues,
even in the unlikely event Congress were to legislatively overturn the affirmed, and
entrenched, Feres doctrine, the FTCA precludes liability unless the claimant can show
that the servicemember's wrongful acts or omissions happened while he or she was
"acting within the scope of his office or employment." The "scope of employment"
standard still precludes claims of sexual assault and harassment because sexual assault
and harassment "cannot be considered performing the employer's work."
Julie Dickerson, A Compensation System for Military Victims of Sexual Assault and Harassment,
222 MIL. L. REv. 211, 226 (2014).
540. Ortiz, 786 F.3d at 822. The Tenth Circuit included a litany of prior decisions in which courts
reluctantly applied the Feres doctrine. Id. at 822-23.
541. The future of Feres might well include refinement. Following their loss in Ortiz v. U.S, the
plaintiffs appealed to the United States Supreme Court on October 13, 2015. Patricia Klime,
Military Family Pushes Supreme Court to Consider Malpractice Claim, MIL. TiES (Dec. 21, 2015),
http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/12/21/military-family-pushes-supreme-court-cons
ider-malpractice-claim/77500274/. The govermnent's response to the motion is pending following
an extension requesting more time. Id.
542. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
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than not, are left without access to justice, making the availability of
alternative remedies even more important.5 43 The civil class action lawsuit
is one strategy proven successful in contexts like prisons, and lawyers have
attempted to use it to help victims in the military; however, because of the
issues with immunity, they have not been attempted, or when they have, they
are unsuccessful. Klay v. Panetta was filed on behalf of twelve women
who were sexually assaulted across the Navy and Marine branches of the
military. 4' However, unlike the plaintiffs in Neal, the plaintiffs in Klay did
not sue the government, but instead named individual high-level government
officials as defendants.5 4 6
The Klay complaint alleged that the Department of Defense failed to
follow Congressional mandates to address sexual victimization in the
military; specific to the female plaintiffs, it alleged that these failures led to
their claims of rape and sexual harassment being ignored and to them
receiving significant retaliation for speaking out.5 47  "Rather than being
respected and appreciated for reporting crimes and unprofessional conduct,
Plaintiffs and others who report are branded 'troublemakers,' endure
egregious and blatant retaliation, and are often forced out of military
service."5 4' The basis of their claims rested on three constitutional violations
implied under the First, Fifth, and Seventh Amendments. 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
dismissed the complaint procedurally, agreeing with the district court that
the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.50
The Court of Appeals, without ever getting to the merits of the case,
determined that the plaintiffs did not have access to a Bivens cause of
action-the gateway to tort liability against the government-in the first
place.5 5' This roadblock will effectively bar all similar cases from moving
forward, no matter how egregious the sexually violent actions on the part of
543. See supra Part I.
544. See, e.g., Cioca v. Rumsfield, 720 F.3d 505, 511 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)).
545. Complaint at 4, Klay v. Panetta, 758 F.3d 369 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 13-5081).
546. See id.
547. See id. at 3.
548. Id. at 3.
549. Id. at 32-34.
550. Klay, 758 F.3d at 376-77.
551. Id.
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military service members and the corresponding failure by the military to
address this victimization.5 5 2 The court discusses this predicament:
Their appeal is both difficult and easy. Difficult, because it
involves shocking allegations that members of this nation's armed
forces who put themselves at risk to protect our liberties were
abused in such a vile and callous manner. Easy, because plaintiffs
seek relief under a legal theory that is patently deficient.5 5 3
Despite this difficulty, the Court of Appeals was unwilling to move the
roadblock that stands in between the aggrieved plaintiffs and the opportunity
to have their claims adjudicated by a court of law. 54 The inability to access
a Bivens cause of action rests on the satisfaction of one specific legal test
that requires a particular harm be perpetrated in a way that is considered
"incident" to military service.
Kori Cioca, along with twenty-eight current and former members of the
United States armed forces, filed suit against two former secretaries of
defense and alleged a battery of sexual violence by fellow service
members. 5 56 They argued that their reports of sexual violence were met with
skepticism, hostility, and retaliation by military authorities.57 Like in Klay,
they alleged that the defendants' acts and omissions in their official
capacities contributed to a military culture of tolerance for the sexual crimes
perpetrated against them, and they sought damages pursuant to Bivens.
In this case filed after the initial Klay complaint but decided before the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rendered its decision, the
Fourth Circuit explained its nearly identical decision to Klay, to prevent the
case from moving forward because a Bivens remedy was unavailable. 559 The
court was unwilling to extend this remedy to the plaintiffs because,
"Congress, not the courts, is in the proper constitutional position to conduct
such an inquiry and provide a statutory remedy should it determine that
552. See infra note 553 and accompanying text.
553. Klay, 758 F.3d at 370.
554. Id. at 371.
555. Id.
556. Ciocay. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d 505, 506 (2013).
557. Id.
558. Id.
559. Id. at 518.
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action is warranted."5 6 0 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cioca does
not deny that the allegations are egregious, but it is deeply committed to the
notion that the only remedy available is one that would come from
Congress-not the courts-who has, to date, failed to act:
In the more than twenty-five years since the Supreme Court
pronounced in Stanley that servicemembers will not have an implied
cause of action against the government for injuries arising out of or
incident to their military service under Bivens, Congress has never
created an express cause of action as a remedy for the type of claim
that Plaintiffs allege here. And it is Congress, not the courts, that
the Constitution has charged with that responsibility.5 6 1
This Article is not the first to urge Congressional action on this issue.5 6 2
This change in policy would open doors for military victims of sexual
violence in a significant and meaningful way.56 3 Further, in the spirit of
breaking intellectual silos among closed institutions, this Article supports an
amendment to the FTCA that creates an exception for sexual assault claims,
regardless of not being incident to any service.56 4  This legislative solution
would help survivors of sexual assault gain access to civil remedies across
institutions and is in need of more research and support.5 65
The relative success and resulting remedy of the Neal case is not
available to victims in the military, but it should be.56 6 Drawing this
560. Id.
561. Id. at 517.
In concluding that Plaintiffs lack a Bivens cause of action in this case, we do not
downplay the severity of Plaintiffs' allegations or otherwise imply that the conduct
alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint is permissible or acceptable. Rather, our decision reflects
the judicial deference to Congress and the Executive Branch in matters of military
oversight required by the Constitution and our fidelity to the Supreme Court's consistent
refusal to create new implied causes of action in this context.
Id. at 518.
562. See Rust, supra note 521, at 271; Schmid, supra note 266, at 506; Vallandingham, supra note
517.
563. See generally Patrie, supra note 536.
564. See Gregory C. Sisk, Official Wrongdoing and the Civil Liability of the Federal Government
and Officers, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L. 295, 314 (2011) ("In any event, the Supreme Court, while not
overturning Bivens, is now more likely to defer to legislative action on whether a private damages
remedy should be created for recompense against alleged official wrongdoing.").
565. See id.
566. See David Saul Schwartz, Making Intramilitary Tort Law More Civil: A Proposed Reform of
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comparison between the prison and military systems is not without
precedent, even in the courts.5 6 7 The military plaintiffs in the class action
lawsuit, Cioca v. Rumsfeld, "likened their situation to situations that
prisoners face, at least in the sense that members of the armed forces, like
prisoners, cannot engage in 'self-help against Constitutional deprivations'
like civilians can."5 68 Further, explaining the limitations inherent in working
in a closed system,
[a]ctive duty service members cannot move homes or change cities,
they cannot take personal actions like civilians can-such as calling
the police, seeking the aid of a shelter, or getting out of town-and
they cannot simply quit their jobs to go find new employment away
from the rapists that they are forced to live near, work with, and
salute everyday.5 6 9
Scholars have also noted the similarities among the closed system
facilities. 70  One author proposes a three-part test to assess whether
members of the military who are sexually abused may sue for monetary
damages, using the Eighth Amendment test of malicious harm and deliberate
indifference from the prison context.5 71 However, she also argues that Feres
is here to stay, and although it may be desirable to overturn it, "neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court is likely to do so.",572 That said, there is
hope that congressional leaders might learn from the struggles of those
trying to address sexual abuse in prison and consider refining Feres to at
least offer a remedy for sexual-violence victims in the military.5 7 3
The four primary outcomes of the Neal class action-monetary
compensation, system change, increased awareness, and deterrence-should
the Feres Doctrine, 95 YALE L.. 992, 1006 (1986) ("[T]he Feres doctrine indiscriminately accords
the same absolute protection to combat decisions as it does to the decision to commit a sexual
assault.").
567. See Tara D. Zickefoose, Battling the Unforeseen Enemy: The Constitutional Attack on
Military Sexual Assault, 48 TULSAL. REV. 143, 162 (2012).
568. Id.; see Transcript of Hearing on Motions at 12-13, Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d 505, 506
(2013) (No. 12-1065).
569. Transcript ofHearing on Motions at 12-13, Cioca, 720 F.3d at 506 (No. 12-1065).
570. See infra notes 571-72 and accompanying text.
571. See Patrie, supra note 563, at 142-49.
572. See id.
573. See supra note 541 and accompanying text.
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be extrapolated further into the military context by allowing sexual-assault
victims access to the courts through civil lawsuits.7  In examining these
closed systems together, this Article draws comparisons between the
incidences of sexual assault and barriers to reporting and investigation, and
applies lessons from one context to another.175  In prison, policy changes,
media attention, and even federal oversight were not sufficient alone to
address sexual violence in the system: the class action was an essential tool
to effect change and compensate victims.5 76 It follows that the class action
could similarly operate to finally create the type of change that society,
including the judiciary, acknowledges is necessary in the military.
CONCLUSION
There are significant lessons to be learned from engaging in
comparisons among seemingly disparate closed institutions like prisons, the
military, and immigration detention centers.17 7 Though markedly different
in their respective societal roles, these systems are all similarly characterized
by rampant sexual violence, problems with reporting and related
investigations, the failure to provide meaningful internal mechanisms for
redress, and limitations in legal remedies. 7' This Article urges policy
makers, lawyers, scholars and others to break down the silos across these
closed systems and extract lessons from both the successes and failures to
better address the problem of sexual violence.
574. See supra note 464 and accompanying text.
575. See supra Sections III.A-B.
576. See supra Sections III.A.1-2.
577. See supra Part III.
578. See supra Part II.
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